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Jurisdictional Statement 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-35-26(2), and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, whereby a Defendant in a District Court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from 
a final judgment and conviction or judgment and order securing 
the same for any crime of a First Degree Felony or capital 
offense. 
In this case, the Honorable A. Lynn Payne, acting pro tern, 
rendered final judgment denying the Defendant's Motion for 
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea to the charged offense of second degree 
murder, a First Degree Felony, in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, County of Uintah, State of Utah, sustaining judgment and 
convictiona 
viii 
Statement of the Issues 
1% Was Defendant's guilty plea rendered involuntarily by 
the actions of the prosecutor and the trial court? 
2. To make a knowing and voluntary guilty plea must the 
Defendant understand the elements of crimes charged and 
relationship of law to the facts? 
3. Did the trial court's reliance on the defense attorney's 
explanation of the law and its relationship to the facts require 
that Defendant's plea be withdrawn? 
4. Was Defendant denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel under the sixth and fourtheenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution? 
5. Did the representation provided by defense counsel fall 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment? 
6. Did the errors and omissions of defense counsel prejudice 
the Defendant? 
7. Was the proceedings against the Defendant conducted with 
"Fundamental Fairness? 
8. Did the prosecutor's illusory conduct and inducement of 
Defendant's guilty plea reach impermissable coercion and 
vindictive proportions? 
9. Can belated facts material to the victim's factual cause 
of death and mitigatingly favorable to the Defendant's theme of 
mental culpability previously not know to Defendant %M the trial 
Court, nor reasonably investigated by defense counsel, support 
newly discovered evidence under the exceptions unnecessary rule? 
10. Does a reasonable probability exist that had the trial 
court received all circumstance facts material to the victim's 
cause of death pivotal to factual foundation for Defendant's 
guilty plea acceptance/ would the outcome of the hearing have 
been different? 
11. Can the Defendant's plea of guilty remain 
Constitutionally sound, absent Defendant's acknowledgment of 
guilt, to the required conscious and knowing objective standard 
and underlying mens rea elements of deprived indifference murder 
liability? 
12. Does reasonable probability exist that/ had the 
prosecutor and defense counsel exercised due diligence and 
reasonable investigation measures surrounding the victim's cau^e 
of death and presented those facts to the court/ would the 
outcome of the plea hearing been more favorable to Defendant? 
13. Did the omissions of the victim's factual cause of 
death prejudice the factual foundation of Defendant's 
"intelligent and/or knowing plea"? 
14. Did defense counsel deny effective assistance of 
counsel by failing to appraise Defendant on all material facts of 
the crimes charged and defenses available? 
15. Did the reviewing Court on the Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea, deny the Defendant due process and 
procedural fairness and abuse its discretion in failing to 
appraise the record unbiasly and at face value? 
16. Did the reviewing court's findings undermine the 
required mens rea and mental culpability foundation of fact 
necessary to sustain depraved indifference murder liability in 
its decision? 
17. Were the reviewing court's findings of fact and 
18. Can a reviewing court independently include speculation 
and theorized findings of fact and conclusions of law in its 
decision not evidenced facially or in nature upon the record? 
19. Can a reviewing court based upon its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, exercise liberty to directly challenge 
State statutory standard and this court's Constitutional 
requirements of Rule 11, application and depraved indifference 
murder liability in denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea? 
Text of Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
Amendment V, United States Constitution (in pertinent part): 
nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law • . . 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution (in pertinent part): 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution (in pertinent part): 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within it's jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Article 1. Section 7, Utah State Constitution, 
"Due Process of Law." 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article 1. Section 12, Utah State Constitution 
"Right's of Accused Person's" 
In criminal prosecution's the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compell the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alledged to have 
been committed/ and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgement, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the right's 
herein guaranteed• The Accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
77-35-11 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures (in pertinent part): 
Rule 11. Plea's. 
(e) the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has 
made the findings; 
(1) that if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) that the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) that the defendant know's he had rights' against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights'; 
(4) that the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burtlen of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5> that the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and, 
(6) whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what agreement 
has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of an plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by 
the court. If recomendations as to sentence are allowed by 
the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
77-35-I6. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures (in pertinent part): 
Rule 16. Discovery 
(A) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material 
or information of which he has knowledge; 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants. 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant. or mitiaatP tHe Hpnroo ~r ~**~~~~ *~~ -* -» 
(B) The prosecutor snail maKe a n aisciosures as soon <±i> 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
77-35-20. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures. 
Rule 20. Exceptions Unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings on orders of the court are 
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party state his 
objections to the actions of the court and state reasons 
therefore. If a party has no opportunity to oboect to a 
ruling or order/ the absence of an objection shall not 
thereafter prejudice him. 
77-35-30. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures (in pertinent part). 
Rule 30. Errors and Defects. 
(A) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
76-1-501. Utah Code Annotated. 
Presumption of Innocence - Elements of Offense Defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be aqquitted. 
(2) As used in this part, the words "element of the offense1* 
mean; 
(A) the conduct, attendant circumstances or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in t.he 
definition of the offense; 
(B) the culpable cental state required; 
76-5-201. Utah Code Annotated. 
Criminal Homocide - Elements - Designations of Offense. 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting 
with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, causes the death of another human 
being, including an unborn child, there shall be no cause of 
action for criminal homicide against a mother or a physician 
for the death of an unborn child caused by an abortion where 
the abortion was permitted by law and the required consent 
was lawfully given; 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second 
degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile 
homicide. 
76-5-202. Utah Code Annotated. 
Murder in the First Degree (in pertinent part). 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree 
if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another under any of the following circumstances; 
76-5-203. Utah Code Annotated. 
Murder in the Second Degree (in pertinent part). 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor; 
(A) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of 
another; 
(B) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another/ he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that causes the death of another; 
(C) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes 
the death of another; or 
76-5-205. Utah Code Annotated. 
Manslaughter (in pertinent part). 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor; 
(A) recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(B) causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse . . . 
76-8-1001. Utah Code Annotated. 
Habitual Criminal - Determination 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses 
having been at least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state would have been 
a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of 
second degree, and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second degree 
committed in this state, other than murder in the first or 
second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for five years to life. 
Rule 103. Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Plain Error (in pertinent part). 
(D) nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights, although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court. 
Rule 52. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52. Findings By the Court (in pertinent part). 
(A) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or without an advising jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgement shall be entered pursuant to rule 
58(A); in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the 
court shall similarly set forth the finding of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for finds are not necessary for purpose of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
. . . 
(B) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 
ten (10) days after entry of judgement the court may amend 
its findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgement accordingly. The motion may be made in actions 
tr-ied by the court without a jury. The questions of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgement, or a motion for a new trial. 
vx 
JAMES F. GARDNER 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 2 
JAMES F. GARDNER, 
Defendant/Apellant. 
Case No. 900225 
Priority (3) three 
Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal from final order denying defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, as entered to the charged 
offense of Second Degree Murder, 76-5-203<c) U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended, a First Degree Felony, in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court, County of Uj^intah, State of Utah, Honorable A, Lynn Payne, 
Pro-Tern, Presiding. 
The appellant Mr. Gammer, entered his Plea and was 
immediately sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison on 
April 2nd 1985, where he remains at the time of this filing. 
Statement of Facts 
Please refer to Adendum "B" Voluntary Statement of James F. 
Gardner, as to the underlying facts of this case. Further, 
Defendant was arrested, charged with second degree murder, 76-5-
203 Sub-sections (b) and (c) and extradited to Utah. (R.2) 
On March 11, 1985, Defendant was arraigned in Circuit Court 
and appointed counsel representation of Lance Wilkerson. (R. ) 
On March 18/ 1985, Defendant terminated representation of 
counsel Wilkerson based on alleged misconduct. (R. ) 
On March 21, 1985, the Court appointed replacement counsel 
of Anthony J. Famulary. <R. ) 
On April 2, 1985, Defendant based upon counsel 
representation waived preliminary process and was bound over to 
District Court, and entered a plea of guilty to the charged 
offense of second degree murder, sub-section (c)'s depraved 
indifference (Adendum "AM. 
Defendant entered his Plea to an amended information, which 
added, subsection (a) of the murder statute* (R. 1.) 
In exchange for the plea, the prosecution was to forego the 
filing of the murder charge as a First Degree Felony Murder 
charge, and was to forego the filing of a Habitual Criminal 
charge,. along with the dismissal of a three-count Third Degree 
Felony Forgery charge. (Adendum "A") 
Upon the Defendant's Plea, the Court immediately sentenced 
and committed defendant to five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. <R. ) 
On July 19, 1989, through retained counsel representation of 
Solomon J. Chocon, Defendant sought to withdraw his Guilty Plea 
by Motion, as involuntary. (R. 61) 
On November 9, 1989, the Eighth District Court, Judge A. 
Lynn Payne, Pro-Tem Presiding, recei extensive argument, 
evidence and witness testimony concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the reception of Defendant's Guilty Plea. <R. 672) 
On April 2, 1990, Honorable A. Lynn Payne, issued his 
decision based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
whereby, denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Plea. <R. 
271) 
On April 12, 1990, Defendant, Pro-Se, sought by Motion to 
Amend and/or Set Aside the Findings and Decision of the Court as 
Clearly Erroneous. (R. ) 
On April 24, 1990, the Court denied Defendant's Pro-Se, 
Motion upon Review, further noting concern that the Motion, 
(Served by Mail) may not have been filed in a timely and 
sufficient manner. (R. 283). 
The Court denied all Motions, and this appeal follows. 
Summary of Arguments 
The Prosecutor's actions surrounding the inducing of 
Defendant's plea, were coercive and vindictive in purpose, 
involving concessions of foregoing the filing of First Degree 
Murder, Habitual Criminal, Auto-Theft and Forgery charges, 
evidencing prosecutorial misconduct. The Trial Court committed 
plain error in failing to Itjmiftc/Vli*! Statutory and Constitutional 
safeguards and requirements of Rule 11 and depraved indifference 
murder liability were factually evidenced prior to the acceptance 
of Defendant's plea. Further, the Court's reliance on counsel's 
explanation of the law, Rule 11 application and the facts, 
deprived the Court of the required factual foundation necessary 
for an intelligent and knowlingly made plea. That the 
Prosecutor's and Defense Counsel's explanation of the facts 
prejudiced Defendant, and evidencing substantial lack of 
preparation and investigation of facts surrounding and procuring 
the victim's cause of death, and that the evidence as denied the 
Court was both pivotal and mitigatingly favorable to Defendant's 
theme of mental culpability and charged elements of offense. 
That Defense Counsel's ineffective assistance fell below any 
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reasonable standard of professional judgement or objective, 
highly prejudicing any possibility of an intelligent plea and 
rendering defendant's plea involuntary and a manifest injustice 
under totality of representation. 
Defendant further seeks this Court's review of the Court's 
(on Motion to Withdraw) clearly erroneous Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in denying Defendant's Motion, and the 
reviewing Court's fresumed challenge of this Court's 
Constitutional requirements of Rule 11 and depraved indifference 
liability and application. 
For manifest reasons Defendant is entitled to withdraw his 
plea. 
Arguments 
Point I. Defendant's Guilty Plea was rendered involuntarily 
by the actions of the prosecutor and the trial court. 
A Guilty Plea, to be Constitutionally valid, must be knowing 
and voluntarily given. Santobello y_ New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971). A Plea of Guilty requires the Defendant's knowledge and 
volition because such a plea necessitates that Fundamental 
Constitutional Rights, including the right to a Jury Trial, must 
be waived; and any such waiver must be suigect to careful 
scrutiny. Bovkin v Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); U.S. v Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570 (1968); State v Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); 
State y_ Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 77-35-11(e)(2), prohibits a trial judge from accepting 
a plea which is not voluntarily entered into; Rule 11(f) permits 
the parties to present a tentative plea agreement to the Court, 
together with supporting rational for the bargain, in order to 
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allow the Court to indicate whether it will approve the bargain. 
Defendant's plea in this case was rendered unknowing and 
involuntary by the behavior of the prosecutor and the trial 
court. 
Regardless of whether the Trial Court is influenced by 
prosecutorial behavior which erradicates the benefit of the 
bargain in a Plea agreement/ the conviction and sentence must be 
vacated and the Defendant allowed to withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Santobellow v New York, 404 U.S. 236. 
[VHhen a Plea rests in any significant degree on a promise 
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must 
be fulfilled. 
The Supreme Court in Santobello reversed and remanded that case 
even though the recommendation that had been promised and 
unfulfilled had not influenced the trial judge. The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the Santobello standard reafirming the 
prosecutor's duty to comply with the terms of bargains entered 
into between the State and the Defendant. State y. Copeland, 765 
P.2d at 1275-76; State v Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1303-04 (Utah); 
State v Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1976). 
Equally disfavored are promises which are illusory in nature, 
providing no real "bargain" to the Defendant. In State v 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1275 (Utah), at sentencing the Defendant 
requested to withdraw his plea because he claimed to have 
mieunderstoood the nature of the States promise to recommend a 
certain sentence and, therefore, to have misunderstood the 
possible sentences available for his offense. The Utah Supreme 
Court overturned a lower court decision denying the Defendant a 
withdrawal of a guilty plea, based on the circumstances that the 
defendant may have been "genuinely and legitimately confused 
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about the recommendations promised and therefore about its 
implications for possible sentences." Id. at 1274. 
In Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme 
Court held; 
[A3 plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences# including the actual value of any committments 
made to him by the Court/ prosecutor/ or his own counsel/ 
must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to 
discontinue improper harrassment), misrepresentation 
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises)/ or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper or 
having no proper relationship to the prosecutors business 
(e.g. bribes). Id at 755. 
In the case at bar# the inducements for the plea included 
commitments which were unfulfillable and mislead the Defendant 
into believing that his plea would be advantageous to him. The 
Court in Copeland in citing Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 
(4th Cir. 1975); stated; 
In Hammond/ the Defendant was told tht he might receive a 
prison sentence of 90 years. In fact/ the maximum sentence 
possible was a term of 55 years. Defendant plead guilty so 
as to receive no more than a 25 year sentence. The Fourth 
Circuit held that this misinformation vitiated the 
voluntariness of the plea because the benefit of the 
Defendants bargain had been grossly exaggerated. The 
Defendant was therefore not aware of the true value of the 
states committments. Id. at 19. Brady and Hammond require 
that in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowingly made/ 
the Defendant must understand the nature and value of any 
promise made to him. 
This Court in Copeland held that illusory promises/ which contain 
no real value to the Defendant/ cannot sustain a guilty plea. 
The Copeland Court adopted the reasoning in a Michigan Case, 
People v Lawson, 255 N.W.2d 748 (1977)/ stating; 
tT3he Defendant pleaded gulty to two crimes after the state 
promised not to request consecutive sentences. Under the 
law of the jurisdiction/ the Defendant could not have been 
sentenced to consecutive terms, and thus he derived no 
benefit from the states promises. The Court, relying on 
Hammond, held 'CDlefendant plead with exaggerated belief in 
the benefits of his plea#' Id./ 255 N.W.2d at 570/ and 
'CSUince Defendant >surrendered his right to trial in 
apparant misapprehension of the value of committments made 
to him, he should be allowed to withdraw his plea* 
Further, the Court added; 
The record suggests the possibility that Defendant did not 
understand the value of the committments made to him. If 
the State promised to recommend hospitalization rather than 
a prison sentence or if Defendant understood this to be the 
promise, then he 'plead with an exaggerated belief in the 
benefits of his plea,' and he should be allowed to withdraw 
his plea. Id. at 1275. 
Likewise in this case, Defendant agreed to the guilty plea to 
avoid a habitual criminal charge, and was told by Defense Counsel 
that he could be charged with First Degree Murder. The facts of 
the case could not support a First Degree Murder charge or a 
Habitual Criminal charge. Defendant derived no benefit from the 
promise made to him, and he therefore had an "exaggerated belief 
in the benefits of his plea." As in Copeland Defendant should be 
allowed to withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Point II. Jo. Make g. Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea, 
Defendant Must Understand Elements of Crimes Charged and 
Relationship of Law to the Facts. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-35-11, Rule 11(e)(4), requires that 
the Trial Court, before accepting a guilty plea, meet the 
following requirements; 
(4) that the Defendant understands the nature and elements 
of the offense to which he is entering the Plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
In State of Utah v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), this 
Court examined the requirements of Rule 11(e)(4). In remanding 
the appeal, the Court enunciated the requirements of accepting a 
Guilty Plea. In Gibbons the Court placed the burden of meeting 
these requirements on the Trial Court: 
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Rule 11(e) squarly places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a Guilty Plea is entered. The basis for 
that duty is found in Boykin v Alabama, 395 U.S, 238, 243, 
244, . . . where the United States Supreme Court stated; 
'what is at stake for an accused facing [punishment} demands 
the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in 
canvassing the matter the accused to make sure he has full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and its 
consequences. Id. at 1312. 
The Gibbons Court added; 
Furthermore, to make a knowing Guilty Plea, the Defendant 
must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the 
relationsihp of the law to the facts. Id. at 1312. 
Citing, McCarthy y_ U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 87 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1969), the Gibbons Court examined the Consitutional 
requirements imposed by the United States Supreme Court in 
construing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; * 
the factual elements of the charges against the 
Defendant must be explained in the taking of a guilty plea, 
so that ly£e defendant understands and admits those elements; 
CBDecause a guilty plea Is an admission of all of the 
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly 
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of 
the law in relation to the facts. . . 
. . . the Judge must determine 'that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense included therein to 
which the defendant has pleaded guilty . . . ' 
. . . there is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in 
the record at the time the plea is entered the defendants 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him. (cite 
ommitted). Id. at 1313. 
a. The Reliance by the Trial Court on the Defense Attorneys 
explanation of the law and its relationship to the facts 
requires that Defendant's guilty plea be withdrawn. 
The Gibbons Court also addressed the necessity of the 
Defendants full and knowing consent, and not the Defendants 
agent; 
Some trial courts attempt to satisfy the requirements for 
taking a guilty plea by using a written affidavit. However, 
the affidavits are not uniform throughout Utah, and trial 
Judges often rely on defense attorneys to inform their 
clients of the contents of the affidavit. 
Citing Henderson v Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Gibbons Court 
adopted the Hendersen standard, requiring more than a reliance on 
the defense csiounsels explanation of the law to the facts of the 
case. 
£I3t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea to be 
entered against a defendant solely on the consent of the 
defendants agent-his lawyer. Our cases make absolutely 
clear that the choice to plead fully must be defendants, it 
is he who must be informed of the consequences of his plea 
and what it is he waives when he pleads, Bovkin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 . . . and it is in his admission that he is in 
fact guilty that his conviction will rest. 
Further, 
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11(e), and 
Boykin, the law placed the burden of establishing compliance 
with those requirements on the trial judge. It is not 
sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that 
their clients fully understand the contents of the 
affidavit. Id. at 1313. 
The record reflect that the trial court failed to meet the 
requirements of Rule 11(e). Excepts from the transcripts of the 
plea and sentencing hearing (Adendum "B") support this premise; 




Your Honor, for the State, I would represent 
that there have been some concessions made 
relating to a three-count third degree felony 
forgery case that has been filed in the 
circuit court and is pending in that court at 
this time. Following Mr. Gardners entry of a 
plea to the charge contained in this 
information the State will dismiss those 
charges. Also, the State is foregoing the 
filing of a charge of first degree murder in 
this case. In addition to that the State is 
foregoing the filing of an auto-theft charge 
and a possible habitual criminal charge, 
which that auto-theft charge may allow or may 
have allowed. Those are the concesson that 
the State has made. There have been no 
concessions concerning this immediate case 
and there will be no recommendation as far as 
leniency in sentencing, and none have been 
promised. 
Do you understand whats been stated by 
County Attorney Mr. Gardner? 
the 
A. Yes, 
The Court And it is your understanding that these 






















Have there been any other agreements which 
have not been disclosed that have been made 
with you? 
No Sir. 
Has anybody threatened you in any way to get 
you to make this plea against yourself? 
No, 
Are you making this plea of you own free 
will and choice? 
Yes. 
Are you making this plea because you are in 
fact guilty of murder in the second degree? 
Yes. 
What did you do? 
What did I do? 
Yes. 
I beat him. 
Did you do that to intentionally cause his 
death? 
No. 
Did you do it as an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that caused him to die? 
No. 
Did you engage inconduct which created a 
grave risk to another, and that therefore 
caused death? 
Yes. 
That's what you did? 
Yes. 
So you are making this plea because you are 
in fact guilty of murder in the second 
degree? 
A. Yes Sir. 
The Court Mr. Gardner, to the charge of murder in the 
second degree, as alleged in the amended 
complaint occuring on or about March 6, 1985, 
what is your plea? 
A. Guilty. 
The Court The Court will Accept your Guilty Plea and 
find it knowingly made. 
Several factors support a finding that Defendant was not 
explained the relationship between the law and the facts. First 
of all, the prosecution states that they would forego the filing 
of a first degree murder charge, and that they would forego the 
filing of a habitual criminal <^arge. Both of these "concessions'1 
were illusory promises made to the Defendant to induce his plea 
(See, Point I, above). The Defense Attorney failed to point out 
to the Defendant that the facts did not support a charge of Firpt 
Degree Murder. In addition, the Utah Habitual Criminal Statute 
codified at 76-8-1001, U.C.A., states: 
Habitual Criminal - Determination. Any person who has 
been twice conviced, sentenced, and committed for felony 
offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least 
a felony of the second degree or a crime which, if committed 
within this state would have been a capital felony, felony 
of the first degree or felony of second degree, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a 
felony of the second degree committed in this state, other 
than murder in the first or second degree, be determined as 
a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison 
for from five years to xxxe. 
This statute would not apply to the Defendants pase. The 
Prosecutor and Defense Counsel, knew or should have known, that 
the Habitual Criminal statute was inapplicable, and served only 
to confuse the Defendant. Further, the Defense Counsel failed to 
explain to Defendant that the two "concessions" were of no value 
to him, and therefore, they were not valid grounds to induce his 
plea. 
The record also reflects that Mr. Famulary knew of the 
existence of defenses available to the Defendant; as veil as the 
Judges reservations about the difficulty of the prosecution in 
proving a second degree murder charge, as evident in the 




We would like to add a comment here about the 
facts, that we have some information about 
what happened here from two or three pages of 
police reports and statements made. 
Apparently, Mr. Gardner met the victim at the 
store. Mr. Gainer had been drinking quite 
heavily that night, and having been smoking 
marijuana, and was under the influence of 
those drugs at the time the incident 
occured. They went to Mr. Abbeglon's 
residence. Mr. Abegglen, according to Mr. 
Gardner, french kissed him, which upset Mr. 
Gardner, and ±JI heat of passion kicked him 
and caused some injury and then apparently he 
died from the beating that resulted 
therefrom. (emphasis added). 
Is that the way it happened? 
He committed a homosexual act against me, and 




That caused you to become upset? 
Yes. 








No Sir, I was - - -
Did you know what you were doing when you 
were doing when you were kicking him? 
No I didn't. 
Mr. Nash? 
Your Honor, I would represent, and it's in 
the reports based upon this, that 1^ 
understood Mr. Famulary recommended his 
client, based upon this report, this plea is 
entered. There may have been and there was, 
an initial striking. The victim waa knocked 
unconcious. The Defendant then had time to 
put his shoes on, go gather some of this 
things in the house, take some personal items 
belonging to the victim, then as the 
Defendant was getting ready to leave, the 
victime regained conciousness, tried to get 
up and the Defendant then went back, after he 
had a chance to cool off and realize what was 
going on, and administer another severe 
beating which resulted in the death of the 
victim. It was not done in the heat of 










caused the death, and these facts have been 
explained to Mr Famulary. These are the 
facts to which Defendant himself has admitted 
in at least two statements made to police 
officers. (emphasis added). 
Which version is the true one? 
Thats basically correct. The second time, 
from what I gather from this police report, 
was the second time of one kick. It wasn' t a 
second beating. But he did have an 
opportunity to go around and collect some of 
the victimes belongings before the second 
time. (emphasis added). 
You understand what you have described to me 
Mr. Gardner, the County Attorney will have a 




just don't want to take it through 
Well, but the point we have to make, you haye 
rights that have to be protected. 
Yes, Sir. 
If you are not guilty of second degree murder 
this Court won't accept a plea of second 
degree murder. Now, what the County Attorney 
described to me the Jury could very logically 
conclude that does meet the limites of second 
degree murder, if these are the facts as they 
occured. 
Yes. 
Its still your decision to plead guilty 
that charge? 
to 
The Witness Yes. 
Mr. Famulary, the Defense Attorney, in explaining what 
happened at the time of the occurance of the incident, spoke 
about the Defendants state of intoxication and his being under 
the influence of marijuana. 
In addition, the record shows that Mr. Famulary was thinking 
in terms of "heat of passion", and element of a crime what was 
not a basis for the plea in the first instance. This led to 
confusion on the part of the Defendant, who was asked by the 
Judge whether he knew what he was doing when he kicked the 
victim. The Defendant responded that he didn't. 
The Judge also expressed reservations about taking a Guilty 
Plea to a second degree murder charge. The Judge states; 
The Court You understand that you have described to me, 
Mr. Gardner, the County Attorney will have a 
difficult time making out a case of second 
degree murder? 
The Defendant was never explained correctly, the significance of 
the defenses that he had to the second degree murder charge. For 
the second degree murder charge, the Defendant admitted to a 
subsection (c), which requires that the Defendant knowingly 
participate in conduct which created a grave risk of death, while 
evidencing a depraved indifference*, T.O human life. Under 
subsection (c), the Defendant must conciously engage in such 
conduct, State v Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984) and 
State y. Watts., 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) • Mr Famulary himself was 
confused as to the elements of the crime as charged. In 
explaining to the Court what had occured the night of the 
incident Mr. Famulary states, in the transcript (Adendum "B"). 
Mr. Abbegglen, according to Mr. Gardner, french issed him, 
which upset Mr. Gardner and in the heat of the passion 
kicked him and caused some injury, and then he died from 
that beating that resulted therefrom. 
If Mr. Famulary had indeed explained the nature of the elements 
of the crime charged as applied to the facts, he would not have 
been speaking about "heat of passion", since that term is more 
commonly, if not correctly, applied to a manslaughter charge, and 
not the crime in question for the plea. Furthermore, the 
Defendant was asked if he was guilty of the charge, murder in the 
second degree, without explanation that each of the three 
separate theories of murder require a different mens rea, as 
stated clearly by this Court, and as set forth below; 
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O. (by the Court). You understand, Mr. Gardner, that the 
Amended Information charges you %*ith the crime of Murder in 
the Second Degree, charging y<?u with intentionally or 
knowingly causing the death of anPtYier, or you committed an 
act which was clearly dangerous to human life, which did in 
fact cause the death of another, or acting under 
circumstances evidencing a deprived indiffernece to human 
life, and engaged in conduct wftich caused the death of 
another. Do you understand that charge? 
That the above further confused the Defendant is obvious by the 
discussions that occured on the record* 
Point III. Defendant gfLfL Q£lLLed h i s Right to Effective 
Assitance of Counsel under the Si/h and Fourteen^/ Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1^ Section 12^ 
of the Utah States Constitution. 
"An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a 
fundamental component of our criminal justice system." United 
States, v Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984). The right is nbt 
satisfied by the mere presence of appointment of counsel. "If no 
actual assistance for the accused's defense is provided, then the 
constitutional guarantee has been violated." Cronic, at 665. 
In Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court established the standard for determining 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to 
prevail, the Defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) Chat counsels performance 
prejudiced the Defendant. Id. at 690* 
In State v Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), this Court 
adopted and interpreted the standard test set out in Stickland. 
Under the first prong of that test, the Court requires a showing 
that the representation fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. The Defendant must show that "specific, 
identified acts or ommissions fall outside tne wide range 01 
professionally competent assitance." Id. at 405. See also, 
State v Pursifell, 74b P.2d 270 (Utah 1977); State v Geary, 707 
P.2d 645 (Utah *985); Codiana v Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983); State v Moritizky, 104 Utah Advance Reports 37. 
Under the second prong of the test, the Defendant must show 
that the deficiency was prejudicial to the Defendant. This Court 
in State y_ Fe^me, Supra, at 405, held; 
To be found sufficiently prejudicial, Defendant must 
affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability exists 
that, but for Counsels error, the result would have been 
different'. 
Further, the Court in Frdme stated; 
tHDowever, these principles are not applied as a mechanical 
test, but are guides to the ultimate focus upon the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings challenged. The 
purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that Defendant 
receives a fair trial. Id. at 405. 
a. The Representation Provided by Defense Counsel Fell 
Below an Objective Standard of Reasonable Professional 
Judgement. 
As required by State v Fr8me the representation and 
assistance provided by the Defense Counsel shows specific, 
identified acts or ommission which fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. 
The transcript of the hearing held in the above case shows 
that defense counsel did not adequately explain the elements of 
the crime and their relationship to the facts as required by 
Bovkin and U.C.A. 77-35-11(e)(4). (See Point II above). The 
Trial Court questioned Defendant briefly but failed to explain 
section 76-5-203(1)(c), which required that the Defendant 
"knowlingly participated in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death, while evidencing a depraved indifference to human life". 
Under this subsection (c), the Defendant must conciously engage 
in such a conduct (See Point II above). The transcript of the 
hearing (Addendum •B") states, after the Defense Counsel had 
supplied the Court with his version of the facts; 
The Court Is that the way it happened? 
The Witness He committed a homosexual act against me, and 
I don't care for homosexuals. 
The Court That caused you to become upset? 
The Witness Yes. 
The Court Were you acting in the Heat of Passion at 
this time? 
The Witness No Sir, I was - - -
The Court Did you know what you were doing when you 
were doing when you were kicking him? 
The Witness No I didn't. 
After this series of questions aimed at the Defendant, the Judge 
then proceeded to question the Prosecutor about the problems that 
were evident. The testimony by the Defendant that he did not 
know what he was doing when he was inflicting the beating, 
negates a finding that the facts supported the plea entered into 
by Defendant. A second degree murder charge requires that the 
Defendant conciously engage in the conduct. Based on the record 
it is apparent that Defense Counsel ommitted to inform the 
Defendant copfectly on what the elements of second degree murder 
are. 
Additionally, it appears that whatever defenses Defendant 
may have had, including voluntary intoxication, were not 
adequately explained to him. The record suggests that the 
Defendant was very intoxicated at the time the incident occured. 
The Defense Counsel states; 
Mr. Famulary We would like to add a comment here about the 
facts, that we have some information about 
what happened here from two or three pages of 
police reports and statements made. 
Apparently, Mr. Gardner met the victim at the 
store. Mr. Gardner had been drinking quite 
heavily that night, and having been smoking 
marijuana, and was under the influence of 
those drugs at the time the incident 
occured. They went to Mr. Abbeglon's 
residence. Mr. Abegglen, according to Mr. 
Gardner, french kissed him, which upset Mr. 
Gardner, and in heat of passion kicked him 
and caused some injury and then apparently he 
died from the beating that resulted 
therefrom. (emphasis added). 
The above excerpt shows that Defense Counsel was confused about 
the elements of the crime involved. Mr. Famulary speaks of "heat 
of the passion"/ when the crime charged and plead to by Defendant 
required a different element. 
Further confusion is apparent on the record/ the Trial Court 
Judge accepted the plea to the second degree murder charge 
despite the facts not supporting the plea. 
The Court If you are not guilty of second degree murder 
this Court won't accept a plea of second 
degree murder* Now, what the County Attorney 
described to me the Jury could very logically 
conclude that does meet the limites of second 
degree murder, if these are the facts as they 
occured. 
The Witness Yes. 
The Court Its still your decision to plead guilty to 
that charge? 
The Witness Yes. 
The repeated inquiries by the Judge, about the facts not 
supporting the second degree murder charge, support the 
contention that Defense Counsel failed to fully inform the 
Defendant of the defenses available to him, in addition to the 
difficulty the prosecution would have in proving all the elements 
of the charge. 
In State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1989), this Court 
stated, ". . . the factual elements of the charges against the 
Defendant must be explained in the taking of a Guilty Plea so 
that the Defendant understands and admits those elements" and the 
Judge must determine "that the conduct which the Defendant admits 
constitute the offense charged in the indictment or information 
or an offense included therein to which the Defendant has pleaded 
guilty." In the case at bar, the Defendant never ad<uitt<id to 
have "consciously or knowingly" engaged in the conduct required 
for a second degree murder charge. Instead, the Defendant 
stated, "he did not know what he wa£ doing" when the incident 
occured. This deficiency shows an ommission on the part of the 
Defense Counsel to adequately explain the crime to Defendant, and 
a lack of preparation of a defense to second degree murder 
charge. Hr. Famulary advised the Defendant to plead to a set of 
facts which did not support the plea, an ommission which should 
be held to fall outside the "wide range of professionally 
competent assitance", and falling beneath an objective standard 
of reasonableness as required by State, v. Frdme. For further, 
additional support to the alleged deficiencies of material value, 
see "New Points Raised on Appeal"/ as to Defense Counsel 
effectiveness. 
b. The errors and ommissions of Defense Counsel prejudiced 
the Defendant. 
Under the two prong test of State v_ Frfime and Strickland, 
the defendant must show that the deficiency of Defendants 
representation were prejudicial to the Defendant. Requiring an 
affirmative showing that a reasonable probability exists that, 
but for Counsel's errors the result would have been different. 
Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a second degree murder 
charge on the advice of his attorney. If the matter had been 
taken to trial a "reasonable probability" exists that but for 
counsels ommissions and errors, the jury might have found him 
guilty of a manslaughter charge or lesser charge (see, New Issues 
Raised on Appeal). 
More evidence for the contention that the results might 
reasonably have been different is found in the inadaquacy of the 
plea bargain struck with the Defendant, (See, Point I above), as 
well as the lack of information afforded to the Defendant about 
the nature of the elements in relation to the crime (Point II, 
supra). 
Defendants statements at the change of plea hearing show 
that he was confused about what was going on during the plea 
negotiations and the acceptance of the plea. Defendant was under 
extreme psychological stress and was undergoing treatment, as 
evidenced by the medical reports of M. Tind Gurule (R. 117) as 
Mr. Famulary failed to proceed in the Defendants best interests. 
c. The proceedings against the Defendant were not conducted 
with "Fundamental Fairness". 
This Court in FrOme at 405, addressing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims stated; 
However/ these principles are not applied as a mechanical 
test, but are guide lines to the ultimate focus upon the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings challenged. The 
purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that defendant 
receives a fair trial• 
The defense provided to the Defendant denied him his right to be 
treated with the fundamental fairness required by Fr&me. The 
ommissions and deficiencies of Mr. Famulary's performance 
prohibited the Defendant from making an intelligent and informed 
decision whether to plead to a serious charge of second degree 
murder. 
New issues under plain error doctrine and Exceptions Unnecessary 
Rule ("Exceptional Circumstances"). 
Point I. The Prosecutors illusory conduct and inducement of 
Defendants guilty plea reached impermissable coercive and 
vindictive purportions. 
While Courts have been reluctant to allow challenges to a 
guilty plea which is alleged to have been involuntarily entered, 
in Marchibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962), the Supreme 
Court did recognize that involuntary pleas are subject to 
collateral attack. "A guilty plea, if induced by promises or 
threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is 
void," and a conviction based upon such a plea is open to 
collateral attack. Id. at 513. 
The presence of coercion alone does not necessarily render a 
guilty plea involuntary. The Supreme Court has held the 
following concerning plea bargaining, which in itself, is 
inherently coercive. "A plea bargain is a process of give and 
take, if the Defendant is free to accept or reject the plea 
bargaining agreement without 'fear of punishment or retaliation', 
the plea is voluntary." Bordenkircher v Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 363 
(1978); United States v French, 719 F.2d 387 (11th Cir. 1983), 
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cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2175 (1984); and also, Coflill v Jaqo, 
747 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984). 
When determining whether a guilty plea is involuntary, the 
court should examine the record, in totality of circumstances 
surrounding the reception of plea and nature of alleged coercion. 
When the State seeks to induce a guilty plea, the prosecutor 
is not at liberty to threaten to prosecute the Defendant on a new 
or different charge without "probable cause to support that 
charge." Blackledqe v Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
Though the Court in Bordenkircher v_ Haves, held, absent 
exceptional circumstances, Blackledqe does not apply to plea 
bargaining, the Court found no due process violation when the 
prosecutor had threatened during plea negotiation to re-indict 
Defendant on a more serious charge if the Defendant refused to 
plead guilty to the lesser crime originally charge, reasoning 
that, a due process violation lies "not in the possibility that a 
Defendant might be detered from the exercise of a legal right . . 
but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating 
against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction." The 
Court concluded that the danger of retaliation does not exist in 
a plea bargain setting, "when the accused is fully informed on 
the terms of the offer and is free to accept or reject it." 
The pivotal factor in Haves as is material to the instant 
case, is that, "the Prosecutor told the Defendant during plea 
neqotiations that he would seek a superseding indictment on a 
more serious recidivist charge if the Defendant refused to plead 
guilty to the original charge• Id at 358-59• 
But contrary to the case at bar, "The prosecutor 'admitted' 
that he possessed the evidence" necessary for the recidivist 
charge at the time of the original indictment and that the 
Defendants refusal to plead guilty led to the re-indictment. Id. 
at 359. 
Therefore the "probable cause" standard of Blackledqe, has 
not been depleted in the context of plea negotiations. See, 
Ricketts v Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1987) remand, (84-2069) 
F.2d (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
Further, this Court should review the following material 
facts in point; 
(1) On March 7th 1985, Defendant was charged with second 
degree murder 76-5-203, subsections (b) and (c)• By Information 
and Warrant <R. 2.3.). 
(2) Between March 7th 1985, and April 2nd 1985, the County 
Attorney re-assessed the evidence of the case (and offense 
charged) and amended the information, adding 76-5-203(1)'s 
subsections (a) as intentional and knowing factor of the murder 
statute (R.l.). 
(3) Prior to the amendment of the Information "all evidence 
received was appraised for the filing of formal charges, the 
central evidence being Defendant's confession, and since the 
amendment no new or different evidence has been admitted, 
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sufficient to support probable cause to elevate the second degree 
murder charge, to first degree, capital homicide.* (R.4.) 
(4) That Utah's Habitual Criminal Statute as used by 
prosecution for inducement of Defendant's plea, could never have 
been charge in conjunction with the Homcide Statute in the first 
place. 
(5) That at the hearing of November 9th 1989, on Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, substantial testimony was 
presented by "every witness present", that extensive apprehension 
and coercion surrounded the inducement of Defendant's plea. (R. 
672) . 
(6) That on March 12th 1985, Defendant was transported by 
emergency basis to the Ashley Valley Medical Center, surmounting 
psychological duress and excessive nerosis disorders. (R. 117). 
(7) That Defendant was placed on psychatropic medications 
(R. 117.). 
(8) That Defendant was refered to Uintah Basin Mental Health 
for emergency counseling from, M. Tina Gurule. (R. 117). 
(9) That psychologist M. Tina Gurule, kept daily 
confidential reports addressing psychological conditions of 
Defendant. (R. 117.) 
(10) That the psychological reports support excessive 
apprehension and concern by Defendant, of receiving the Death 
Penalty, inducing life threatening (suicidal) contemplation. (R. 
117.) 
(11) That Defense Counsel Famulary testified on November 9th 
1989, to excessive concern of more serious charges forthcomming 
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upon Defendant's failure to plead guilty, was directly resultant 
as an inducement for Defendant's plea. (R. 672.) 
(12) That witnesses as family members testified on November 
9th, 1989, that Counsel Famulary requested out of concern of more 
servere charges, that famiy members induce Defendant to plead to 
"avoid the death penalty." (R- 672). 
(13) That the State upon a plea of guilty, would forego the 
filing of First Degree Murder, Auto-Theft and the Habitual 
Criminal Charge. (Ademdum "B"). 
(14) That the State at no time upon the record, 
substantiated the new evidence or probable cause standard, 
supportive for the filing of additional or more serious charges 
against the Defendant. (R. 1-672.). 
(15) And, that Defendant himself testified on November 9th 
1989, that he plead guilty to factually avoid the death penalty 
as evidenced upon Counsel's representation. 
This Court should consider the prosecutor's illusory conduct 
as what the United Supreme Court, and the Ninth Circuit Court 
clearly consider prosecutorial vindictiveness. In Ricketts v. 
Adamson, (Supra) the Court reviewed circumstances of a vindictive 
or alleged vindictive plea agreement. In citing, North Carolina 
v Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969) the Court held; that the 
14th Amendment guarantees • • • protect against judicial and 
prosecutorial vindictiveness. In Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 
21, 27 (1974) the Court extended the rule to Pearce to protect 
the accused. "Presumption of apprehesion was held to violate due 
process safeguards," as re-affirmed in, United States v 
Robinson, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Bvrd v McAskle, 
733 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1984); and United States v 
Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 668 (9th Cir. 1986). In Martinez 
presumption is raised when the increased charges arise from the 
same nucleas of operative facts that substantiated the earlier 
charge. The Court in Blackledae clearly set forth due process 
requirement that it is the prosecutors "duty" to bring forth the 
more serious charges at the outset of the criminal prosecution to 
be acting in societal interest. In reiteration of cause, no new 
evidence has ever been admitted sufficient to increase the second 
degree murder charge to that of a first degree. In Robinson, it 
was the prosecutors "attempt" to seek heavier penalty for the 
same acts, that constituted the declaration of inherently 
suspect. The Robinson Court further concluded that, "it was the 
prosecutors attempt or threat to up the ante, by bringing new and 
more serious charges in response to the exercise of a protected 
right that violated the due process guarantee." See also: 
Martinez. 
In United States v. Demarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.) 
cert denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977) the Court held; 'that it is 
"constitutionally impermissible" to up the ante or threaten to up 
the ante, to dicourage a defendant from exercising a protected 
right.' The right ae issue in Demarco was a change of venue. 
In United States v Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 
1977) and United States v Ruesqa-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 
(9th Cir. 1976) the respective Courts held "that when a 
prosecutor decides or expresses intent to increase the charges 
against the accused, "legitimate justification 'must* be made 
upon the record", and be acting so in the normal assesment of 
societal interests and prosecution." 
As for Defendant's alleged apprehension and inducement, 
- ^ . ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^^^A #Mn*iv direct the Court, in part, to the 
confidential psychological reports of M. Tina Gurule, S.S.W. (R. 
117.). 
James received some information about his trial today and is 
worried about that. He over heard some one say that it was 
said by the police that he was going to be sentenced to 
death row. James took this rather bad without thinking, and 
has been having thoughts of suicide because of it . . . 
Defendant's claims are further supported by the record in its 
entirety. 
A plea that results from prosecutorial misconduct may render 
a Defendant's plea involuntary. U.S. v^  Russell/ 686 F.2d 35, 41-
42 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Miller v Anqliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2nd 
Cir.), cert denied, 109 S.Ct. 224 (1988); with, U.S. v Jordan, 
870 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir), cert denied, 110 S.Ct. 101 (1989); 
and White v U.S., 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988)* cert denied, 109 
S.Ct. 1163 (1989). To prove Voluntariness under this standard, 
the Defendant only needs to show, "that fear of the possible 
consequences of not pleading guilty destroyed his ability to 
balance those risks against the benefits of going to trial." 
Clark v Salem, 693 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 
U.S. 1090 (1983) and, Gano v U.S., 705 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th 
Cir. 1983). 
Point II. Related Facts Material to the Victims Factual 
Cause of. Death and Mitiqatinqlv Favorable to Defendant's 
Theme of_ Mental Culpability Previously Not Known to 
Defendant or the Trial Court, nor Reasonably investigated by 
Defense Counsel, Should Support Newly Discovered Evidence 
Under Utah 's Exceptions Unnecessary Rule. 
Under Utah's Exceptions Unnecessary Rule. Rule 20 
(U.R.C.P.) failure to object to specific orders or rulings by the 
Court are unnecessary if a party has no fair opportunity to 
object. Rule 20 reads; 
txcepxions x.o rulings or ux u«x» ui cue ^wux «- «aA <= 
unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party state his 
objections to the actions of the Court and the reasons 
therefore. If a patty has no opportunity to object to a 
ruling or order, the absence of an objection shall not 
therafter prejudice him, (77-35-20) 
Your Appellant addresses said rule in concern of belated facts 
material to the factual foundation of his conviction based pleas, 
whereby, seeking this Court's exception under two prong 
application supportive of newly discovered evidence and manifest 
injustice, preserving the points for appeal on Counsel's 
inadaquacy of objection. 
At Defendant's guilty plea hearing (Adendum "B") Defendant 
was represented by Counsel Anthony J. Famulary, who made 
statement along with the Prosecutor's proffer of facts 
substantiating the basis for the guilty plea acceptance, which 
was clearly contrary to Defendant's version of facts (Adendum 
"B"> inducing concern upon the Court as to which facts were true. 
Defendant adopted the facts rendered by Counsel representation, 
though consistantly sustaining his theme of accidental causation 
of death to the victim. 
Defendant, herein, makes point of inadaquate representation 
by Defense Counsel's failure to object to the "facts" as 
presented by the Prosecutor, and adopting these facts in the face 
of substantial concern before the Court, and failing to 
adequately investigate and prepare the "factual cause of death" 
required for factual foundation supporting the guilty plea. 
Having recognized Defendant's conflicting version of facts, 
it was incumbent upon the Court pursuant to Rule 11 and Rule 20 
U.R.Cr.P., to insure that manifest injustice would not occure, 
irrespective of Counsel's ommissions. Rule 11 requires factual 
foundation for any plea acceptance. (Rule 11(e)). 
On July 30, 1986, approximately 16 month after Defendant's 
guilty plea was entered, Defendant was questioned by the members 
of the Utah State Board of Pardons, Initial Parole Consideration 
Hearing, and informed by Chairwoman, Victoria Palacios, asking if 
Defendant was aware of the plastic covered plate on the victims 
skull, that fractured and caused the death of the victim. 
Defendant denied any such knowledge. (Adendum "D") As these 
"facts" were not known to Defendant prior to his entering his 
guilty plea, nor were they ever explained to the Court in the 
taking of the plea. (Adendum "B"). 
On November 9th 1989, upon Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
his Guilty Plea, Defense Counsel Famulary testified on cross-
examination that his sole investigation surrounding circumstances 
of the victim's cause of death constituted, the reading of the 
summary of the autopsy report and the death certificate (R. 672, 
T.P. 245-264.) which had precluded any factual ascertainment of 
the central cause of death. 
Defendant's consistent theme of mental culpability has been 
a servier beating by provocation. Resultant in accidental death* 
The Prosecutor based his assesment of second degree murder upon 
two separate beatings, the second of which procured death. 
Yet, the post-mortem autopsy report unequivocally declares 
that the victims central cause of death was a subdural hematoma, 
and hemmorrhaging resultant of fracture, the focal area was the 
plastic covered plate, as there were no other fractures nor 
damage to the brain/ and these facts, procured the victim's 
death. In addition, it would have be virtually medically 
impossible to determine which if any, of the assaults procured 
death, and that these factual circumstances of causation of 
death, were mitigatingly favorable to both the severity of the 
charge and mental culpability required for plea. 
Upon reasonable investigation by Counsel, these facts would 
have precluded the Court's acceptance of the guilty plea, where 
it was apparent that "these were not the facts". 
The ommission of such material facts were highly prejudicial 
to Defendant effecting substantial rights reviewable* under Rule 
11 and 20 as manifest error. State y_ Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 
952; State y_ Steinbeck, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050; State y_ 
Codianna, 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977); State v Norton, 675 P.2d 557 
(Utah 1983). Also see, United States v Werrerlin, 583 F.2d 346, 
352-53 (7th Cir. 1978) cert denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979) (for 
insufficient factual basis for plea). 
Further, in State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) this 
Court upheld; that, "ordinarily this Court will not entertain an 
issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances or plain error." State y_ Norton; State y_ Steqqell, 
660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). This Court should consider the 
points raised as both exceptional in circumstance and plain 
error, Jolivet v Cook, (no. 880341) P.2d (Utah 1989), 
and exception as unnecessary for preservation on this appeal. 
a. Substantial probability exists that, had the Trial Court 
received all circumstance facts material to the victims 
cause of death pivotal to factual foundation and acceptance 
of Defendants guilty plea, the outcome of the hearing would 
have been different. 
The Trial Court did not receive all circumstance facts 
material to the foundation of fact for acceptance of Defendant's 
plea (see, Point II, supra.) and the ommissions of said facts 
was "pivotal" to the Courts acceptance of the plea. Had the 
Trial Court received all necessary facts material to the crime 
charged . . • the outcome of the hearing would have been 
different. 
At Defendant's plea hearing (Adendum "B") the proceedings 
were conducted in pertinent part as follows; 
Mr. Famulary We would like to add a comment here about the 
facts, that we have some information about 
what happened here from two or three pages of 
police reports and statements made. 
Apparently, Mr. Gardner met the victim at the 
store. Mr. Garner had been drinking quite 
heavily that night, and having been smoking 
marijuana, and was under the influence of 
those drugs at the time the incident 
occured. They went to Mr. Abbeglon's 
residence. Mr. Abegglen,^ according to Mr. 
Gardner, french kissed him, which upset Mr. 
Gardner, and in. heat of passion kicked him 
and caused some injury and then apparently he 
died from the beating that resulted 
therefrom. (emphasis added). 
The Court 
The Witness 
Is that the way it happened? 
He committed a homosexual act against me, and 









That caused you to become upset? 
Yes. 
Were you acting in the Heat of Passion at 
this time? 
No Sir, I was - - -
Did you know what you were doing when you 
were doing when you were kicking him? 
No I didn't. 
Mr. Nash? 
Your Honor, I would represent, and it's in 
the reports based upon this, that !_ 
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understood Mr, Famulary recommended his 
client, based upon this report, this plea is 
entered. There may have been and there was, 
an initial striking. The victim was knocked 
unconcious. The Defendant then had time to 
put his shoes on, go gather some of this 
things in the house, take some personal items 
belonging to the victim, then as the 
Defendant was getting ready to leave, the 
victime regained conciousness, tried to get 
up and the Defendant then went back, after he 
had a chance to cool off and realize what was 
going on, and administer another severe 
beating which resulted in the death of the 
victim. It was not done in the heat of 
passion. It^ i_s_ the second beating which 
caused the death, and these facts have been 
explained to Mr Famulary. These are the 
facts to which Defendant himself has admitted 
in at least two statements made to police 
officers. (emphasis added). 
The Court Which version is the true one? 
Mr. Famulary Thats basically correct. The second time, 
from what I gather from this police report, 
was the second time of one frick. It wasn' t a, 
second beating. But he did have an 
opportunity to go around and collect some of 
the victimes belongings before the second 
time. (emphasis added). 
The Court You understand what you have described to me 
Mr. Gardner, the County Attorney will have a 
difficult time making out a case of second 
degree murder? 
The Witness Yes. 
trial 
I just don't want to take it through 
The Court Well, but the point we have to make, you have 




If you are not guilty of second degree murder 
this Court won't accept a plea of second 
dearee murder. Now, what the Countv Attorney 
described to me the Jury could very logically 
conclude that does meet the limites of second 
degree murder, if these are the facts as they 
occured. 
The Witness Yes. 
The points raised herein support substantial concern as to 
the Courts reliance upon the facts presented. (See Point II, 
Supra), Furthermore, as supported by witness testimony on 
November 9th 1989, on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Plea (R. 
672.) the transcribed proceedings are not complete by reporter 
error. When the Court questioned Defendant, if he acted within 
the heat of passion, Defendant misconstruing the Courts question 
in a homosexually derogatory sense, "elaborated on circumstance 
surrounding the death of the victim, including unknowing, 
uncontrollable and accidental causation of death (Adendum "B", P. 
11, L 10). Defendant's dialog, clearly ommitted. 
With substantial concerns evidencei/ had the Court received 
the unequivical facts and central causation of the victims death, 
the court "more than likely" would not have accepted the guilty 
plea entered. 
It is unquestionable, that the facts presented were pivotal 
to the Court's reception of Defendant's plea. 
Rule 30, Section 77-35-30 U.C.A. (1953) as Amended, (1982 
ed.) states; 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
effect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. (U.R.C.P.) 
The meaning of this standard, though not entirely clear regarding 
reversable error, has been held by this Court in several cases, 
that the Rule 30 phrase "affect the substantial rights of a 
party" means that an error warrants reversal "only if a review of 
the record persuades the Court that without the error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
Defendant." State v Night, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), citing. 
State v Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (quoting, State 
v Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982)). See also, State v 
Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (1986); Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984); and United States v Baqley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
This Court further reasoned in Night, that 
although the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
'reasonable probability' is not binding on this Court when 
construing State Criminal Rules, we are persuaded that 
defining the substantively identical term 'reasonable 
likelihood' by reference to a revieving Courts confidence in 
the outcome of trial makes good sense in determining whether 
reversible error has occured. Rules that govern criminal 
proceedings are meant to insure that a trial is a search for 
truth and that the verdict merits confidence. 
For reasons in point, this Court should remand this case, and 
allow Defendant to withdraw his plea. 
b. Defendant's guilty plea cannot remain Constitutionally 
sound, absent Defendant's acknowledgement of guilt to 
required concious and knowing objective standard and 
underlying Mens Rea elements of depraved indifference murder 
liability. 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty, based upon Defense 
Counsel's representation, to the charged offense of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony 76-5-203 (D(c)'s depraved 
indifference standard. 
Under Utah's statutory Rule 11 guidlines, taking of a guilty 
plea, before accepting a plea, the Judge must insure that the act 
to which the Defendant admits, is the offense to which he is 
charged. State y^  Breckenridge; McCarthy y. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 467 (1967). The procedure for the factual basis is 
formed in inquiries surrounding Defendant's admittance to the 
required mens rea elements of the crimes charged. 
The instant case clearly establishes the trial courts 
failure in securing required factual basis for depraved 
indifference murder liability tirrd- the Court's acceptance of 
Defendant's plea. 
When questioned by the Court as to Defendant's guilt to the 
individual mens rea elements of the second degree murder statute/ 
Defendant clearly negated his plea; the following collaquay 
establishes that fact: 
The Court 
A. 
Are you making this plea because you are in 
fact guilty of murder in the second degree? 
Yes 
The Court What did you do? 
A. What did I do? 
The Court Yes• 
A* I beat him. 
The Court Did you do that to intentionally cause his 
death? 
A. No. 
The Court Did you do it as an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that caused him to die? 
A. No. 
The Court Did you engage inconduct which created a 
grave risk to another, and that therefore 
caused death? 
A. Yes. 
The Court That's what you did? 
A. Yes. 
Based upon this inquiry, the Court accepted Defendant's 
guilty plea. But, upon later review of the facts presented by 
the County Attorney, which induced substantial concern on the 
Court, the Court made additional inquiries; 
The Court Is that the way it happened? 
The Witness He committed a homosexual act against me, and 
I don't care for homosexuals* 
The Court That caused you to become upset? 
The Witness Yes. 
The Court Were you acting in the Heat of Passion at 
this time? 
The Witness No Sir, I was - - -
The Court Did you know what you were doing when you 
were doing when you were kicking him? 
The Witness No I didn't. 
(Also see, Point II,A. Supra.) The issue evidenced by 
statements made at the plea hearing clearly negate any reference 
of guilt under depraved indiffernece murder liability. In State 
JL Frdme this Court held, that to be liable under section 76-5-
203(1)(c) the Defendant must act knowingly and be aware, that his 
conduct creates a grave risk of death. Id. at 1046. 
Engaging in conduct while aware that the conduct creates a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" is a reckless act that would 
support a conviction for reckless manslaughter under 76-5-
205(1)(a). As this Court reduced a second degree murder 
conviction to manslaughter in State y_ Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 
1982) because the evidence showed that the Defendant "was aware 
of the risk occassioned by his conduct and that he conciously 
chose to disregard it". Id. at 676. 
Murder liability under section 76-5-203(1)(c), on the other 
hand attaches when the actor engages in conduct which causes 
death, with "knowledge that Cit creates 3 a grave risk of death to 
another." State v_ Fontana. Causing death while knowingly engaged 
in conduct which creates a risk of death is virtually the same as 
causing death while "aware of the risk" occasioned by dangerous 
conduct. Therefore, after Fontana the only distinction between 
depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter is the 
additional Juror judgment that "the magnitude of the risk created 
by the a particular Defendant's conduct objectively evidences the 
Defendant's deprave indifference to human life." State y_ 
Russell, (No. 18591) P. 2d (1987). 
Under the Utah State Constitution and Utah Code Annotated, a 
Defendant pleading guilty must plead to specific and required 
elements of the charged offense. Though this Court has 
distinctly classified either one, or all subsections of the 
second degree murder statute sufficient to sustain murder 
liability. State y_ Russell. The issue in point iff subsection 
(c)'s depraved indifference; 
The words "Element of Offense" mean; 
(a) the conduct, attendant circumstances, or Results of 
Conduct Prescribed, Prohibited, or Forbidden in the 
Definition of the Offense; 
(b) the Calpable Mental State Required; 
Defendant ultimately negated any admittance of guilt of the 
required Mens Rea elements of deprtfved indifference by statements 
to the Court that "he did not know what he was doing when he was 
kicking him" (the victim). As at this stage in the proceedings 
the Court was trying to ascertain the necessary mental 
culpability that has never been evidenced upon the record, 
whether through police records; confession or counsel, and 
unequivically required for the plea by Ffl/nt&ia, also see; State v 
Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983); Henderson v Morgan, 426 U.S. 
645, 647, 94 S.Ct 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976); U.S. v Goldberg, 
862 F. 2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988); U.S. v Darlincj, 766 F. 2d 
1095, 1099 (7th Cir.) Cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985); and 
U.S. v Allen, 804 F. 2d 244, 247-48 (3rd Cir. 1986), case 
remanded to clarify whether, in finding factual basis, the Court 
relied on government evidence or mistaken belief that Defendant 
admitted element of crime.) Cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987), 
and , U.S. v_ Keiswetter, 866 F. 2d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Under the term manifest injustice this court should review 
this point in totality of circumstance surrounding the factual 
basis securing the plea, and find that plea invalid. 
In McCarthy v United States, 394 U.S. 459 89 S. Ct. 1166, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), the United States Supreme Court stated; 
"CBlecause a guilty plea is an admision of all the elements of a 
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the 
Defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to 
the facts." Id at 466, 89 S. Ct. at 1171. (footnotes omitted), 
also see: State y_ Gibbons, 740 P. 2d at 1312. 
The importance of this requirement was demonstrated in. 
State £ Breckenridqe, 688 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983); in Breckenridqe 
the Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of arson, this Court 
determined on appeal that the Defendant had not understood the 
nature and elements of the charge of arson, "because neither his 
confessions nor his account of the event at the arraignment 
suggested that he had intentionally damaged the building." Id at 
443. Because intent is a necessary element of the crime of 
arson, the court determined that the plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. Id at 444. 
Identical to Breckenridqe, the instant case evidences in the 
r e c o r d , t h a t Defendant did n o t understa n d 1: h e elements n ecessary 
t: o c o n s 1: :i t n it. t e t: i i e c i i iii e a i i d m i s u n d e i s t o o d I: i ::i s a c t: s a s £ i I: t, j n g 
that ci itei I,a ai id 1 ike Breckenridqe, it was the Judge who fai 1 ed 
to note that 11 ie ac 1:i ons the Defendant described did not satisfy 
the elemen 1:s of 11 \e :::i i m€ 
c. Sustantial probability exists, that had the 
prosecutor and defense counsel exercised due diligence 
and reasonable investigate ve measures surrounding the 
victim's factual cause of death and presented those 
facts to the court, the hearing would have been more 
£ a v o r a b 1 e t o D e f e n d a n t:. 
The omissions of the Coi inty Attorney and Defense Counsel 
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heai ing would have been more favorable to Defendant effecting the 
ultimate! foundation of consideration and the court's acceptance 
". j"! t h e fj'JjLta. 
ThiiH Court s h o u l d r e v i e w t h i s p o i n t u n d e r t h e . m a n i f e s t 
in^-1'"* i. *• * * o n e .v -~ * i . i-»
 #.e ^ < 
\n ti-
t h e ri etained duty discloe- -. * * - *• ; *L < -,€ 
charge* offense .- • defense, it 
cons 
evidence "know: negate * . ^ reused/ mitigate 
guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment." Rule 16 (4) (Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure), and at the fact finding stages of any criminal 
proceeding must present to the court, the "unequivocal facts*1 to 
substantiate foundation of truth in the charged offense, or 
foundation for a conviction based plea. By error of this 
Constitutional standard under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah State Constitution, Defendnant is 
clearly entitled to witdraw his plea of guilty. U.S., y^  Russell, 
686 F. 2d 35, 41-42. (D.C. Cir. 1982); Miller v Anqliker, 848 F. 
2d 1312, 1320 (2nd Cir). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 224 (1988); 
also; see U.S. y. Jorden, 870 F. 2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir) cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 101 (1989); White v U.S., 858 F. 2d 416 (8th 
Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1163 (1989). On 
prosecutorial misconduct of this nature, this court in State y. 
Mefriuli, 734 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1987), held; 
In cases involving wrongful failure to disclose inculpatary 
evidence, the 'state' has the burden of persuading the court 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense and 
there was no reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, 
the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to 
the Defendant. 
The instant case clearly shows the error in point, as 
overwhelmingly prejudicial and highly effecting the outcome of 
the proceeding. 
The Court questioned the State as to the facts surrounding 
the victim's cause of death, as concern was apparent that the 
necessary elements of depraved indifference was not evidenced in 
the facts (Addendum "B"). The State or County Attorney having 
assessed the case for prosectution (R. 1, 2, 3, 4.), knew, or 
should have known the material facts central to the victim's 
cause of death, namely, the subdural hematoma and hemorrhage 
i e s u ] t a n I: :> f 11 i a a k' i ] 3 f i a c 1: u i e t: 1 1 a t: w a 3 p 1: o c m ,. 1 c= d f 1 o m 11 1 e 
s u r g i c a 1 1 y imp1anted p 1 a s 1 1 c covered p 1 a t e , n o t e d as 11 ie c h r o 1 1 i c 
surgical defect and the focal area of contusion to the br aii 1. 
( Pi idendi 1 ni " C ' ) 
1 1 1 11 1 e C o u r t' s reference that the S t a t e m a y h a v e a h a r d 
t i m e m a k li n g o u 1: a c a s e o f s e c o n d d e g r e e m u r d e r , o r p r o s e c u t i n g 
the case on the facts presented, it was
 a p p a r e n « t that the court 
was confused as to the facts, and woul dxfiave accepted the gul Ity 
pie a h a d t h e S t a t e presented t h e '"' £ a c I: s " c r i t i c a 1 t o foundation 
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charged , a 11 d m i t i g a t i o n necessary for as c e 1 t a i n m e n t o £ m e n t a. 1 
culpabil i t} • 1 e q u i r e d f o 1 d CE • p • 1 a 1 ' €5 d i ndifference material to 
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n
 United States y_ Brffiv, the Supreme Court held that the 
p 1 o s e c u 1 2 o 1 i a "l s 1 i p H . ^ M n i i, .... o £ e' :I d e i i c e f a1| J o i a 1: .1 e t ::: a n 
accused , v i o l a t e s due process where t l le ev idence :i s mater i a l 
t o e i t h e r g u i l t , on punishment, il 373 U .S. 83 , 83 S, Ct 1194, 1 0 
I E< :1 2d 21 !!::> C I 96 /3) " II i I mir I i n ft rule i son ;, UjiiUid S t a l e s , 
788 1: 2d 53 1 51 9 : ° * l ' " i I MBl. i h e l d ; t h a t t hi' d e t i n i t i o n of 
m a t e r i a l ! ty a p p l i e s * I cases ol p r o s e c u t o r i a l f a i l u r e to 
d i s c l o s e favorabh ' evidence , whether thiprr was "no reques t a 
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Defendan 
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" s p e c u l a t i v e l a c t a " tdint j i i i j any f a c t u a l founda t ion nnd ly 
guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment." Rule 16 (4) (Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure), and at the fact finding stages of any criminal 
proceeding must present to the court, the "unequivocal facts" to 
substantiate foundation of truth in the charged offense, or 
foundation for a conviction based plea. By error of this 
Constitutional standard under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah State Constitution, Defendnant is 
clearly entitled to witdraw his plea of guilty. U.S. y^  Russell, 
686 F. 2d 35, 41-42. (D.C. Cir. 1982); Miller v Anqliker, 848 F. 
2d 1312, 1320 (2nd Cir). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 224 (1988); 
also; see U.S. y. Jorden, 870 F. 2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir) cert, 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 101 (1989); Vhite v U.S., 858 F. 2d 416 (8th 
Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1163 (1989). On 
prosecutorial misconduct of this nature, this court in State y. 
njakt 
HeJiuli, 734 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1987), held; 
In cases involving wrongful failure to disclose inculpatary 
evidence, the 'state' has the burden of persuading the court 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice th€» defense and 
there was no reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, 
the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to 
the Defendant. 
The instant case clearly shows the error in point, as 
overwhelmingly prejudicial and highly effecting the outcome of 
the proceeding. 
The Court questioned the State as to the facts surrounding 
the victim's cause of death, as concern was apparent that the 
necessary elements of depraved indifference was not evidenced in 
the facts (Addendum "B"). The State or County Attorney having 
assessed the case for prosectution (R. 1, 2, 3, 4.), knew, or 
should have known the material facts central to the victim's 
~~..«« ^* Hnath. namelv, the subdural hematoma and hemorrhage 
- , I f i, A,l< 6 Ay 
1 a :
 ' " I :!l > 3 - c ; o i :i e : : t ^ \ n e y j * • i jii r //t o d I s c l o s e m a t e r i a 1 
f a c t s £ a v o r a b 1 e t o t h e De f e n d a n 1 a i d p i e j u d i c a 1 ] y t a k i n g 
a d v a n t a g e c f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s l a c k o f i i i v e s t i g a t i o n and 
F i ej: >az a t j oi : ": 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Brady, supported by United 
States v Baqley, U S. jlOS S (It 3375 80 L. Ed. 2d 4 8 3 (] 985) 
c • I: :: I: 1 t 1 m« I e cil e r a ] i , i d S t a t e G c: > v e :  i i m e :i t , i i i 
United States v Hiqqs 713 i 2d 39, 4 2 C3i d Cii 3 98 3) Cer t 
denied C t: 1 25 (1984 ) , t.he Cour t he 1 d that excu 1 patoi y 
evidence "applies to materia3 s going 1:o the hear t of Def endant' s 
gui.l t or i nnocence and to materials that might we] ] alter the 
J u r y ' s , j u d g m e n t o f t h e c r e d i b i 1 i t y o £ c r i m i n a 1 p r o s e c u t i o n 
witness" Citing Giqli* v United States, Supra note 73, 411)5 U. 
S i Ii 54 j ) A1 a• > 8 1 »!• e ; Sellei s 'v Estelle , I 2< I 3! 074 ( 51:h 
C i i 19 8 3 : C e i t denied, 102 S . C1 .1 2 92 < 1 9i w 1! i e i e 1: h e C o u i t 
held; * F B I Record would have allowed the defense counse1 to 
t 
Foundatit based alation" or prosecutorial 
error, :i s insufficient * > sustain a plea, ai id should be I leld 
void. 
i B 
favorable to "the defense in terns of mitigation or inculpatory 
evidei . - J^ learly rests withii i consideration of the 
in el g i 1 1 in i in in in v 
i McKay v Worth Carolina, i i ft S Ct 12 27 
(1990 ;' Supreme Couzt enunciated standard for 
tigating evidence in capital homicide cases under the 
a mi :i • ::1 1 1 i i s C o u i t « h o i 13 d consider 
the State Constitutional impact in the instant case. 
The Court in McKav, citing Eddinqs v_ Oklahoma^, 455 U.S. 
104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, (1982), held, that a Judge 
could not refuse to consider evidence proferred by the Defendant; 
the Court further reasoned; "just as the state may not by statute 
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, 
neither may the sentencer refuse to consider (as matter of law) 
any relevant mitigating evidence." See also, Penrv v_ Lynouah. 
492 U.S. 109 S. Ct. 2J934, , 106 L Ed. 2d 256, P.p. 
1231-1234. 322 N.C. 1, 372 S. E. 2d 12 (1988). 
•A Judge may not refuse to consider .... or be precluded 
from considering any relevant mitigating evidence." 
Under the rational enunciated by the Supreme Court, "if the 
finder of fact 'reasonably could have believed evidence as 
mitigating', that evidence is material." United States y. Baqlev, 
473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). Also see; State 
v Fontana 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984)• 
Though the majority of the cases cited surmount 
contitutional requirements on capital cases, the McKay Court in 
it assessment, accurately reached the gist of constitutionality 
and materiality of the term mitigating and inculpatory evidence. 
And this Court should apply that standard as no less 
constitutional under the laws of this state in regards to 
Defendant's first degree felony, second degree murder, conviction 
based guilty plea, on the grounds that both the Defendant 
(Addendum "D") and the Court, (Addendum •B"), were denied 
material evidence "pivotal foundation of fact at a highly 
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critical stage of the proceeding and prejudi cing the outcome of 
the hearing 'against: the Defendant." 
And I:I ir ee I)efense Counsel's complete lack o£ investigation 
and pre 11 iaII preparation denied 11 ie D B £ e n d a n t and 1: ! :i€ Court 
£ a c t s m a t e r i a 1 t o a n i n t e 11 i gen t a n d ' o i k: n o w i i :»g a. d m i 11 a n c e o f 
g in j i ,3 t o r p ] e a t o s e c o n d degree m u i d e i ,„ a s m o i e p a r t i c u 1 a r 1 y 
e s t a b 1 i s h e d :i i 1 • ::> :l i 11 ' = ) , \ it i i d e i D e f e n s € C o u i i s e 1 " s 
i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 
d. II ic tot M.I absence ol the vjctjm'u central cause of death 
prejudiced any factual foundation for Defendant's 
"intelligent n I .1 k i mwing p .1 cj a " 
""' A Defendant's i ig 1 :»1: to due process is abridged when the 
IB.entencing Judge i e 1 ies up IDn informal:!on that a s materia 11 y 
in i in 1 1 1 in € • .pif it w I e i : 1:1 IB • J t i d g IB HI a "1 c: e £ » a t e r i a 1 ] y false assumpt i o n s o f 
fact.' ' State v Morgan , ? 1 2; P. 2:d 741, 743 (Idaho Spp . 1985 ) , 
c, iting ; Townsend v Burke, 334 ti. S 73€ C1984 ) a.r :i Ru.1 e 11 
(e)(4), • r e q u i i e s t h e 1: r :I a III c o u r 1: 1: o e s t a b 1J s h a factual b a s :;i s 
for a plea before accept i i ig ::l t "*" State v Gibbons , 740 1 2 i 
1309 (Utah 1987). "If a Defendant does not adroit: to the factual 
b a s i s o f 1: h e g u i 3 1: y p 1 e a
 # t, h e C o u r t m u s I: 1: r e a t t h a t p 3 e a 4 in JE a 
!: r > I: g i 1 3 I ] ; United States v I "ilsek. 65 ; 1 2d 92C "IS 2 i 
(7th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) . The failure of a defendant: ito admit to t .he 
factual basir • *.• the equivalent of a pjl ea of i lot: (guilt y 
ii - a n noi accept a gi ii 1 ty p 1 ea unt i3 1 ic • 1 i s -
determined tha t: there is a fac 1 ua 1 bas::i s £ : i t:I € > JI 1 i= a United 
States v Verrerlin , 583 F 2d 346 , 352-53 ( 7th Ci i: 3 987) Cei 1 
denied, 439 . 1127 (1979) Henderson v Morgan, 4?l U , i f 
ll I "I JI ' ( l I I Hi l l lh II II II I» * S t i l ( i 1 ill) I 111 II II i ' l l J M i C u i l l l M I1H,||IIJII I « \ \ | i l H ( « H 
on the1 I • !!«*• I u r d f f i o l I n e u i i n g t h a t c o n s 1 i t u 1 lone* 1 a i .d 
Rule 11 (e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered, the basis for that duty is found in Boykin v^  Alabama. 
395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 
(1969). 
This Court in State v_ Gibbons, citing; McCarthy v_ United 
States, 3j94 U.S. 495, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), 
stated " there is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
'in the record at the time the plea is entered' the Defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him*. Id. at 
466, 467, 470, 89 S. Ct. at 1170, 1171, and 1172. 
The instant point bears unequivocal support that the Court 
was denied opportunity to find the necessary foundation of fact 
to support the guilty plea, by the County Attorney's and Defense 
Counsel's failure to appraise either Defendant, or the Court of 
the victim's central cause of death (Addendum P B " ) , as Defendant 
did not know of these facts (Addendum •D*), which efectively 
precluded his additional proffer upon the Court. 
The Defendant's refusal to acknowledge the factual basis of 
thfe guilty plea must be "distinguished from an Alford-type 
plea". 
As Defendant's continued prostestations of unintentional and 
accidental inducement of death, were factually supported by the 
autopsy report, (Addendum mCm), but withheld from Defendant's and 
the Court's knowledge or consideration, thus, Defendant's plea 
was not a voluntary, knowingly and understanding consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence secured by admittance to "his 
acts* constituting the crime .... because of Defense Counsel's 
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and the Prosecutor ^missions and err ore .,„ Defendant was never 
appraiser4 . complei - < >-
»~th 
Carolina v Al_ford_/ *,o > ^ , 2d 
162 f19" United States v Fountain, 2c 
198 5 ^
 t ljt^A L 
Guichard . United States v^  
Montoya-Cornocho, 644 * >* ; r « United States 
v Cl.«* i^ -cn n r , i^o^ on ian . - r • the 
prosecute esponse + o inquiry b \p tr. ^or 
reasor treated in poii t o * «* *
 t „ i 
inferieu reference uw yciei.ua.^ i* ^ *.**w ^^ .^.w charged ciie* *• 
Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsesl by 
counsel's failure to investigate and appraise Defendant on 
all material facts of the crimes charged and available 
defense. 
A,i claiming ineffective assistance ~ «, onuses! 
represent a I it oi , I I « i • ' < f p< i ' * t s i: ai sed or appeal, Defendant has 
c 1 eai 1J demonstrated t : 1 a I I • u t f c :  a 1 J, e g * c 1 e r J t > i 111 J «I 
deficiencies ounsel, 1:1 i c i e e x i s t s ",! . s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b a b i l i t y • 
t • in il if 11c-1 f indinci p r o c e s s w a s BO u n d e r m i n e d , 
t h a a - . J p i e i 1 u d e J 1 " o»" ft v I * «'i«.; 1 r in, 
f u r l h e i o r e c l u d e d d u e p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s u n d e r Amendment 
c f" "In 1 led Slatee Constitution. 
U n d e r U i c !!: i v i i i n \ mi i n i I«IMI HI M i npndment i i i 4 i\ \ i l i m t c i d 
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d A r t i c l e 1, S e c t i o n ! r and JIL. ml I h« u i a h 
S t a t e C o n s t D e f e n d a n l it e n t a t J e d l>i, r i g h t , 1c e f f e c t i v e 
ass is 
nstant case has evidenced substant e 
effecting impartial t - ^ • , : •effective 
counsel's lack of diligence in 
investigation and pre-trial preparati of 
material facts to the trial court, which deficiencies effectively 
precluded instruction on available defenses and/or intelligent 
and knowing guilty plea. 
8/ 
This court in State v Fr/frne, 723 P. 2d 401 (Utah 1986), 
held; that "in claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Defendant has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective standard of reasonabless. 
Codianna v Morris, 660 P. 2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must prove that specific identified acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be speculative, but must be 
demonstrative reality, sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
•exercised reasonable professional judgment.* Strickland v_ 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984). State v Lairby, 699 P. 2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984); State v 
Speer, 750 P. 2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988). 
At Defendant's guilty plea hearing (R. 302), Defense 
Counsel's Famul#£y unquestionably "adopted" the State's proffer 
of facts, absent reasonable investigation into the basis of those 
facts. And failed in all capacities to instruct the Court on the 
•central" cause of the victim's death, or the mitigating evidence 
supported therein• 
On November 9, 1989, during evidentiary proceedings 
surmounting the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, 
Defense Counsel Famroulary testified on cross examination putting 
forth the irresponsive rational as to the omissions and 
deficencies in presenting facts to the court, (R. 672. T.P. 245 
to 265). 
Il i I 1 r ( I  I i i M i i 1 it 1 |i i II t n i l I • in i l i t I II i ii i II ) l i n t * I  ( I d I Hi i 
h a d n o t i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e c e n t r a l c a u s e of d e a t h " o t h c i thuiii 1 In 
r e a d ! • -j i f I hi r lc j i l l c e r t i f i c a t e and summary of t h e a u t o p s y 
in i i in c I Ilk HI i, 1 Ii | ml i fMi i nl i f d* <J1 h 'i f v t I ' i I m 
" h e m o i i IHI g i nq L u a i n h e m o r r h a g e * I il n o t h i n g b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of 
I hi s u m m a r y (1 t h e a u t o p s y i c?port T h a i n o b o d y h a d t a k e i f h* 
ilwe d i l i g e n c e i n i n v e s t i g a t e t h e i n c i d e n t t n d o l p r m i i i c if i n 
I di 1
 ( 1 In int-M uiitl h<*.ill j IHI in i |H nl t j i I'll I \ I I i ' I ii f lui I i I I n t 
p r o c u r e d 1 he d e a t h of t h e v i c j « t £ , C i J t i c a J I n e s t a b l i s h i n g a n y 
t y p e of Min h< i c o u n s e l h a d m e r e l y a d o p i e d a se>t of i i n c o m p l e t e 
I II II i I If M i l | I I I I I i I || 
speculatic , ounsel had adopted these facts 
"not * J Defendan* 
take^ J le medical examine 
•reading the autopsy report.* 
This Coui t inn ist recognise that ,i i only the post-mortum 
ii in 1 u|u'i y i fjptu 1 (Addendum * '< I ami 11M «'/ I I 11in i-1 I 1, mi p r o b a b l e c a u s e 
IN 4i in l hen. any mention of the skull f r a c t u r e of which I n d u c e d 
the subdural hematoma and hemorrhage The autopsy report Ip 
and concise reference to Counsel's ascertained hemorrhagii \q '"As 
III s p e c i f 1 c r e s u 1 1 o£ ai x o 1 d s k u 1 3 d e f e c t c £ t 1 n € fronto-partia 1 
skull measuring 4 x 5 Cn. in diameter# which is u v u and covered 
by ^operant plastic , , , , there were no other fractures to the 
skull and the oJ d chronic surgical defect was 11 ie £oca 1 area k£ • 
there were no other chronic contusions noted to the brain. 
If Counsel would have reasonaby investigated the victim's 
cause of death "and read the autopsy report or sought some 
medical determination of factual causation of death, Counsel 
could have corrected the erronious foundation of fact receivied 
by the Court, and presented facts consistant with Defendant's 
theme of mental culpability and undermined the State's bifurcated 
Mens Rea determination of the charge of second degree murder, and 
more than likely, forstalling plea negotiations altogether. 
By counsel's failure to take reasonble investitation, the 
Defendant was effectively denied appraisal on facts material to 
his conviction and punishment, and denied favorable instruction 
on available defense. 
The omissions of such favorable evidence to Defendant at his 
plea hearing invalidated any foundations of fact or consideration 
of an intelligent and knowlingly made plea. 
Irrelevant of counsel's rational in plea negotations, 
counsel cannot effectively appraise a case without preliminary 
investigation. Further, due process requires investigative 
measures sufficient to ascertain necessary circumstances to 
support the changed offense in consideration of defenses. The 
facts clearly support Defense Counsel did not appraise the case, 
and by being himself uninformed as to the elements of the crimes 
charged and relationship of law to the facts Counsel could 
not intelligently inform the Defendant, and in the instant case, 
clearly did not (Addendum *D"). 
The duty bound upon counsel to discover the unequivical 
facts is even more critical in guilty plea proceedings in 
insuring that the Court accepts the Defendant's plea, upon 
foundation of fact, that what the Defendant is pleading guilty to 
is in fact the crime he is charged with, and pleading so, 
intelligently and knowingly to all elements of the charged 
o f f e n s e ,
 W j_th a l l f a c t s b e f c - - r . . t ., 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . S e e , , S t a t e v . B r e c k e n r i d q e , 
1 9 8 3 ) . 
Thf iJHHiH t ii p r i i i 1 c l e a r l y f d l J f h e J o w " a n y ofcjjeM i vv 
11 i I mi i" II MI null I < (i I i 1 (•» *J i i i I i H I! j 11 II11 n i i I C o d x a n n a v 
Morris, 660 I « <l I in I J108-UU MM ah J "MU J I nnd that "the 
inadequ* representat 2 on was nc>t i legitimate exercis e oi 
I iJii 11 q in•.• 11 1 1 ' c:" o J i" 11. r a 11? g \ 1i> i t a r t i <;;; w i 1II'i m r11 i r ;i j i a 1 <•>d 
jesuit," State v McNichol, L>54 f" 2d 20 ,i , /04 (Utah 1976 i As 
coi inse 1 s a11eged de£'iciencies were the resu11 of negligence a i id 
o v e r s i g h 1: i n i n a d e q u a t e 11 i v e s t i g a t i o n a n d a s s e s s m e n t o f f a c t 
s u r r o u n d ] ng t h e d e a t l :i o f t l me \ r i c t i m # a n d t i n , Aerripnt,q o f t } ie 
c h a r g e d o f f e n s e a n d A c t u s R e a o £ t I i e a. c c u s e d v • . • i„ u d i c a, 1 1 y 
precluded a constitutionally required "Intelligent and knowingly" 
State y_ Codianna, 766 F 2d 1062 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . State v Gibbons, 
740 I " 2d 1309 CI J tah 3 987) and Bavkin y_ Alabama, 395 U. S, 238 
69 £ CI II 709 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (196 9). 
Furthermore, a hi gh probabi 1 i 1:y exists that
 i( I"ma«,1 b•j 1 encian 1 
k* D w / t h e fact " - * lead guilty upon counsel's; 
a* *•" « • • :.s stood, Defendant received the 'facts* of f .is 
c a s e :!: i: • :: in I: I i e 1 11 a 1 ,. S t: a t e B c • a i d o f I a i d :: > i i JE V :i c t c: • i ::i JEI , I a ] a ::  :l c • s , 
upon his initial parole consideration hearing on July 30 1 986 
Approximately 3 6 months after he pled guilty (Addendum PD">. 
B a s e d u p :: •' 11 e p ::  :i i t. JE • p • i e s e i n t e d herein , t: I i :i s c o i 11 t B f , :::> i 13, • ::1 \ i L C: <i ,. t e 
all reference o £ Defendant's guilty pie a, a in :i d remand t h i s c a s e 
for trial, 
Additiona 1 iBSUes raised under this Court'a no prejudice standard 
on failure to seek timely motion to amend clearly erronious court 
findings ar id abuse of court decision for preservation on appeal; 
Point I . The reviewing Court on defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, denied pefendant due process and 
procedural fairness abusing its discretion by failing to 
appraise the record unbiaslv and at face value. 
The duty of a reviewing court/ citing Preznell v Georgia, 
439 U.S. 14, 58 L. Ed. 2d 207, 99 S. S. Ct. 235 (1978), is "a 
fundamental component of the criminal justice system's principles 
of procedural fairness, which may not be arbitrarily abused by 
theory and speculation.* 
In Cole v Arkansas, 33 U.S. 196, 92 L. Ed 644, 68 S. Ct. 514 
(1948) (Justice Black, for a Unanimous Court). The Court held; 
it is as much a violation of due process to send an accused 
to prison following conviction on a charge on which he was 
never charged, as it would be to convict him upon a charge 
that was never made. 
to conform to due process of law, petitioners were 
entitled to have the validity of their convictions 
appraised on consideration of the case as it were tried in 
the trial court." ID. at, 201, 202, 9*1 L. Ed. 644. 68 S. 
Ct. 514. 
(1,23, the fundamental principles of procedural fairness 
applies with no less force at the pepalty phase of trial in a 
capital case, than they do in the guilt determining stage of "any 
criminal proceeding." C.F. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 51 
L. Ed. 2d 3j93, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977). 
Further, "if it were error of State Law so to instruct the 
jury . . . the reviewing court may not redeem the mistake by 
ruling that the jury could have believed other evidence 
indicating petitioner had injured his victim other ways." C.F. 
Duncan v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 2 L. Ed. 2d 491, 88 S. Ct. 
1444, 45 Ohio, Ops. 2d 198 (1968) 
The instant case, as is clearly evidenced in the reviewing 
Court's decision on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty 
Plea, had spent the majority of decision redeeming Defense 
Counsel, Prosecutor and Trial Court errors. The Court relied upon 
terms such as "obvious to this Court,* "could have or may have," 
and "had the ability to form,* or was "capable of forming," and 
in error, applied these declarations to Defendant's actions and 
circumstances of the crime and criminal proceedings, that were 
not evidenced by the hearing of April 2nd 1985, (Guilty Plea 
hearing (Addendum "B") and extensively relied upon evidence, 
effects, testimony and additional records not to ascertain 
findings of fact, but to basicly redeem the errors of the Court. 
Defendant has been denied procedural fairness in the 
reviewing of circumstances surrounding the reception of his 
guilty plea, (R. 271 and 283) and therefore, under question of 
law, seeks this Court's review and Constitutional standard in 
correcting manifest error. 
a. The Reviewing Court impermissably included speculation 
and independant theory in it findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, not evidenced facially or in nature upon 
the record. 
The reviewing Court in assessing claimed^ impermissably 
speculated and theorised Defendant's actions surrounding the 
death of the victim, plea negotiations and hearing as consciously 
and knowingly made, when the record in its entirety is void of 
such statement. The court erroniously speculated and theorised 
findings that it relied upon in conclusions, that Defendant had 
told counsel and police •••• and other people (witnesses) 
that he knew what he was doing in causing the death of the 
victim, and erroneously theorized that Defendant was familiar 
with martial arts, and that he disliked homosexuals, to the 
degree of formulating an intent or knowing circumstance for 
murder. 
Contrary to the record, the court found that "the victim was 
knocked unconcious with the first kick of Defendant, and that 
the victim's head (to obtain leaverage), and repeatedly struck 
the victim in the face with the other hand." And that, "the 
victim was unable to defend himself, " and "there is no indication 
that the victim took any action against the defendant after the 
"kiss". These conclusions are incompetent review of the available 
police reports and confessions of Defendant, which unequivically 
support that, an altercation did in fact take place, as the 
virfiin was struck in the eye and nose, inducing bleeding and 
discoloration. Supported by blood analysis on clothing and other 
witnesses statements to police, given in concern of the night of 
the crime. 
The consistent theme of the Reviewing Court has been to 
misconstrue incidents and statements made in an apparent attempt 
to formulate aggravation, intent or a knowing objective, to 
substantiate the conviction based plea, irrelevant of the absence 
of the same upon the record. 
The court further committed error in erroneously concluding 
that, "the Defendant was on parole form Oregon. He had previously 
been convicted of a third degree felony in the State of Utah but 
had received probation for that offense. When the plea was 
entered, both parties were unsure as to whether Defendant's 
record would support an increase in sentencing under the habitual 
criminal statute. The parties, therefore, agreed to forego the 
filing of a possible habitual criminal charge." Here the 
reviewing court impermissably goes beyond the scope of 
speculation, and includes ficticious incidents under conclusions 
that have been factually disputed by both parties since the 
beginning of Defendant's criminal prosecution, as %jt such 
agreement had even been considered. 
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For reasons clearly presented, the reviewing Court's 
findings , conclusions and decisions, as contrary to the record, 
should be set aside as clearly erroneous, inflammatory and highly 
prejudicial to the Defendant. 
Point II. The reviewing court'e findings undermined all 
required mens rea elements and mental culpability 
foundation necessary to sustain defendant's depraved 
indifference murder liability. 
In applying the required liability standard enunciated by 
this court in State v Fontana, 680 P. 2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984); 
also, State v Watts, 675 P. 2d 566 (Utah 1983); concerning 
depraved indifference murder, and the court's Fule 11, 
requirements enunciated in State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), and this Court's adoption of Boykin y_ Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969), Defendant raises three clear errors undermining 
Defendant's guilty plea, found by the reviewing Court in its 
decision, and 'invalidating defendant's plea as voluntary.* 
(1) In citing the plea hearing proceedings, the Court found 
in paragraph <L>, the Defendant then indicated that he did not 
know what he was doing when he kicked the victim. P. 11. (There 
were two separate incidents wherein the Defendant kicked the 
victim. The record does not indicate which incident the 
Defendant was referring to. For the purpose of this hearing, the 
Court will interpret this statement as an indication that he did 
not know what he was doing on either occasion.) 
It must be noted, that when securing this statement from 
Defendant, the trial court was trying to ascertain sufficient 
mental culpability to the conscious and knowing element of 
depraved indifference liability. 
Under the Fontana doctrine, this finding alone requires 
withdrawal of defendant's plea. 
(2) The reviewing Court repeatedly acknowledged in its 
findings of fact that the trial Court failed to comply with Rule 
11 requirements. 
Under the Gibbons doctrine, Defendant was prejudiced by such 
errors mandating withdrawal of Defendant's guilty plea. 
(3) And that the Reviewing Court found in paragraph 20 (in 
pertinent pdrt): .... the victim was alive after the first 
incident, and regained consciousness, and was in the process of 
rising. The evidence further indicates that the victim stopped 
breathing almost immediately after the second incident. The 
medical examiner's report classified the death as a homicide and 
listed the cause of death as "multiple craneocerebral injuries, 
blunt force trauma to the head". Under circumstances, where the 
Defendant had been involved in two incidents *hich were closely 
related in time. It would be virtually impossible to medically 
determine which of the attacks caused the death or whether it was 
a combination of the two." 
This finding by the Court, so undermined the State's 
prosecution that it substantially prejudiced any posssibility of 
foundation of fact sustaining Defendant's plea. *As the State's 
"sole basis of second degree murder, depraved indifference, was 
the "determination" that the second beating procured the victim's 
death. Under Gibbons and Fontana, Defendant's plea should be 
invalidated in view of totality of circumstances, as the factual 
foundation supporting the plea, was nothing but speculation. 
Point III. The reviewing Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, are clearly erroneous and contrary to 
the record on points material to Defendant's motion. 
The context of Rule 52 (a)'a (U.R.C.P. "Clearly erroneous 
standard" .... requires that if the findings are against 
*h#a clear weiaht of the evidence, or if the reviewing court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings will be set aside. State y_ Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Western Kane County Speciail Services 
District, Wo. jL. y_ Jackson Cattle Co. , 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah 
1987); and Barker v Frrtncis, 741 P. 2d 548 (Utah C. Spp. 1987). 
Supporting that, the rule of conclusions of law.... must also be 
viewed for correctness. 
Further, a reviewing court's findings of facts should be 
limited to the ultimate facts and if they are ascertained 
ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the 
evidence, and support the judgment, they will be regarded as 
sufficient. Pearson y_ Pearson, 561 P. 2d 1080 (Utah 1977). For 
additional rational also see Bovde v California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 
(1990); Prezriell v Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 58 L. Ed. 2d 207, 99 S. 
Ct. 235 (1978); and Duncan v Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
In support of this point, Defendant effectively incorporates 
each and every issue raised alleging erroneous Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of law, and moves this Court for the setting 
aside of the Reviewing Courts decision denying the Defendants 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Point IV. The Reviewing Court's decision supported bv its 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of. Law, j e lmpermissablv 
challenging State statutory standard and this Courts 
Constitutional reouirements of Rule 11 application and 
depraved indifference murder liability by denying Defendants 
Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Defendant's incorporation of each and every point raised on 
appeal, and all facts ascertained through prior proceedings in 
concern of Defendants Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, clearly 
support an unintelligent and unknowing made plea, therefore, 
involuntary. The Reviewing Courts assessment of those facts and 
its Findings of material issues are contrary to this Courts 
Constitutional requirements, and in the same context, denying 
Defendant due process and procedural fairness in reviewing the 
claims raised supporting the withdrawal of plea. 
This Court should view the reviewing Courts actions as 
impermissably challenging this Courts holdings and violative of 
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
Conclusion 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, appellant Gardner, 
repectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
sentence and remand the instant case back to the District Court 
for Withdrawal of his Guilty Plea, or alternatively allow him to 
Withdraw his Plea and proceed to trial. 
Z day of July, 1990. 
Attorney Pro-Se. 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 64020 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH CCV 7 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS . 
JANES FRANKLIN GARDNER, 
DEFENDANT. 
3E IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 2ND DAY OF 
APRIL, 1S85, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:30 A.M., THl 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAMS ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
DISTRICT COURTROOM OF THE UINTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 
VERNAL, UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD 5Y THE HONORABLE 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, JUDGE IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL-
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
« £ P £ A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: MARK U. NASH, ESQ. 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
319 UEST 100 SOUTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 8 4 078 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: ANTHONY J. FAMULARY, ESC 
ATTORNEY AT LAVJ 
80 SOUTH MAIN 
ROOSEVELT. UTAH 8 406 6 
LE£0RTEP1S_TRANS_CRIFT 
OF HEARING 
CASE NO 5 CR 2< 
THE COURT: NEXT I S - 3 5 - C R - 2 3 , STATE OF UTAH 
V S . JAMES F . GARDNER. THIS HATTER I S BEFORE THE 
COURT, MR. GARDNER HAVING WAIVED PRELIMINARY HEARING 
THIS MORNING, AND COMING UP HERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
ARRAIGNMENT. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) THIS BEING AN ARRAIGNMENT, 
I S NECESSARY THAT I ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS, MR. 
GARDNER. FIRST OF ALL I S JAMES FRANKLIN GARDNER YOUR 
TRUE AND CORRECT NAME? 
A. YES. SIR. 
Q. ARE YOU KNOWN BY ANY OTHER NAMES? 
A. NO, S I R . 
Q. FOR THE RECORD, MR. GARDNER, ARE YOU 
SUFFERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF ANY ALCOHOL OR DRUGS AT 
THIS TIME? 
A. NO, S I R . 
Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT THIS PROCEEDING I S ? 
XX m /E S
 # SIR-
Q. YCU, UNDERSTAND YOU ARE GOING TO BE CALLED 
UPON TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY TO THIS 
CHARGE THIS MORNING? 
1 V ? C C T S 




















Oil THE AM EN:?r. J w i r L m i u , 
MR. NASH: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
Q. (3Y THE COURT). YOU UNDERSTAND, 11R . GARDNER, 
THAT THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES YOU WITH THE 
CPTtjE OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, CHARGING YOU 
UITH INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER, OR YOU COIIIIITTED AN ACT WHICH WAS DANGEROUS 
ITO HUMAN LIFE, WHICH DID 
ANOTHER, OR ACTING UNDER 
IN FACT CAUSE THE DEATH OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING A 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ENGAGED IN 
CONDUCT WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT CHARGE? 
YES, SIR. 
-ARE YOU PREPARED TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR 
J 3 
NOT GUILTY AT THIS TIMS? 
YES. 
Q. WHAT PLEA DO YOU INTEND TO ENTER? 
A. GUILTY. 
Q. BEFORE THE COURT CAN ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA, 
MR. GARDNER, YOU MUST BE ADVISED OF YOUR RIGHTS. YOUR 
COUNSEL WILL DO THAT ON THE RECORD AT THIS TIME. I'M 
SURE HE HAS ALREADY DONE IT TO YOU BEFORE. 
YES, SIR. 
MR. FAMVLARY: MR. GARDNER, YOU ARE ENTITLED 
TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL IN THIS HATTER. YOU WILL BE 
THE RIGHT T J> PARTICIPATE III THE SELECTION OF THAT 
JURY, AND YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE ALL THE 
WITNESSES YOU HAVE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, INCLUDING 
POLICE OFFICERS OR WHOEVER. 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION 
THAT COMES OUT OF THAT TRIAL. IF YOU PLEAD GUILTY YOU 
ARE WAIVING ALL OF THOSE RIGHTS. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
Q. {3Y THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER, 
THAT YOU HAVE A PRESUMPTION OF BEING INNOCENT UNTIL 
PROVEN GUILTY BY ALL EIGHT JURORS. ALL EIGHT JURORS 
HAVE TO 3E CONVINCED OF YOUR GUILT 3EFORS YOU CAN BE 
FOUND GUILTY. IF ONE OF THEM SAYS NO, YOU ARE NOT 
GOING TO BE FOUND GUILTY. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT THE BURDEN DURING 
THIS ENTIRE PROCEEDING IS ON THE STATE? THEY HAVE TO 
GO FORWARD AND PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE 
OFFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. YOUR COUNSEL AND YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO 
ANYTHING. THEY HAVE THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD, AND 
IF THEY FAIL III THEIR BURDEN IN ANY WAY THEN YOU ARE 
A. YES. 
Q. HOW, YOU HAVE HAD THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
ALL THE WAY THROUGH THIS PROCEEDING, HAVE YOU NOT? 
A. YES. 
Q. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH HIS SERVICES? 
Q. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD ALSO HAVE THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL -- THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON THE APPEAL LEVEL AND THE 
TRIAL, OF COURSE? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND NOBODY CAN TAKE THAT AWAY FROM YOU, DO 
YOU UNDERSTAND THAT 
Q. HAS ANYBODY PROMISED YOU ANYTHING, MR. 
GARDNER? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. IN ORDER TO GET YOU TO MAKE THIS PLEA? 
A. NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: THERE ARE SOME OTHER CHARGES 
PENDING, AS I UNDERSTAND IT? 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, FOR THE STATE I WOULD 
REPRESENT THAT THERE .HAVE BEEN SOME CONCESSIONS MADE 
ELATING TO A THREE-COUNT THIRD DEGREE FELONY FORGERY 
CASE THAT HA- SEEN FILED III CIRCUIT UKT AND IS 
PENDING IN THAT COURT AT THIS TINE. FOLLOWING MR. 
GARDNER'S ENTRY OF A PLEA TO THE CHARGE CONTAINED IN 
THIS INFORMATION THE STATE WILL DISMISS THOSE CHARGES. 
ALSO, THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING OF A 
CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN THIS CASE. IN 
ADDITION TO THAT THE STATE IS FOREGOING THE FILING OF 
AN AUTO THEFT CHARGE AND A POSSIBLE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
CHARGE, WHICH THAT AUTO THEFT CHARGE MAY ALLOW OR MAY 
HAVE ALLOWED. THOSE ARE THE CONCESSIONS THAT THE 
STATE HAS MADE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONCESSIONS 
CONCERNING THIS IMMEDIATE CASE, AND THERE WILL BE NO 
RECOMMENDATION AS FAR AS LENIENCY IN SENTENCING, AND 
NONE HAVE BEEN PROMISED. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'S BEEN 
STATED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, MR. GARDNER? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THOSE 
AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU? 
A. YES. 
Q. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS WHICH 
HAVE NOT BEEN DISCLOSED THAT HAVE BEEN MADE WITH YOU? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. HAS ANYBODY THREATENED YOU IN ANY WAY TO GET 
YOU TO MA?:Z THIS PLEA AGAINST YOURSELF? 
Q. ARE YOU MAKIIIG THIS PLEA OF YOUR OWN FREE 
WILL AND CHOICE? 
A. YES. 
Q. ARE YOU MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE IN 
FACT GUILTY OF MURDER III THE SECOND DEGREE? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A. WHAT DID I DO? 
Q. YES. 
A. I BET HIM. 
Q. DID YOU DO THAT TO INTENTIONALLY CAUSE HIS 
DEATH? 
A. NO. 
C. DID YOU DO IT AS AN ACT CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO 
HUMAN LIFE THAT CAUSED HIM TO DIE? 
A. NO. 
Q. DID YOU ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH CREATED A 
GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO ANOTHER, AND THAT THEREFORE 
CAUSED DEATH? 
YES . 
THAT'S WHAT YOU DID? 
YES. 
SO YOU ARE MAKING THIS PLEA BECAUSE YOU ARE 
















Q. MR. GARDNER, TO THE CHARGE OF MURDER III THE 
SECOMD DEGREE, AS ALLEGED III THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
OCCURED ON OR ABOUT MARCH 6, 1985. WHAT IS YOUR PLEA? 
\ — — • ' 
A. GUILTY. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL ACCEPT YOUR GUILTY 
PLEA AND FIND IT KNOWINGLY MADE. 
WHAT ARE YOUR DESIRES AS TO SENTENCING? 
MR. FAMULARY: YOUR HONOR, WE DESIRE 
SENTENCING TO BE MADE TODAY. MR. GARDNER IS ALREADY 
ON PAROLE FROM THE OREGON STATE PRISON IN SALEM, 
OREGON AND FEELS IT IS IN HIS BEST INTEREST TO WAIVE 
ALL TIME-PERIODS CONCERNED THEREIN. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) YOU UNDERSTAND, MR. GARDNER, 
THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED HOT SOONER 
THAN TWO DAYS NOR MORE THAN 3 0 DAYS FROM TODAY? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. IS IT YOUR DESIRE THAT I GO AHEAD AMD IMPOSE 
SENTENCE TODAY? 
A. YES, SIR. 
FROM HOW? 
YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO BE SENTENCED TWO DAYS 
YES 






















Q . WHAT WAS YOUR PREVIOUS OFFENSE? 
A . WELL, I HAD A NUMBER OF NARCOTIC CHARGES THAT 
WERE DROPPED ON THAT I PLEAD GUILTY TO TRANSPORTING 
STOLEN AUTOS ACROSS STATE L I N E S . 
Q . THEFT CHARGES, THEN? 
r\ • Y E S • 
THE COURT: MR. NASH? 
MR. NASH: T H A T ' S MY UNDERSTANDING, I T WAS 
AN AUTO THEFT CHARGE. I T WAS A. STATE CHARGE, NOT 
A FEDERAL CHARGE, I S MY UNDERSTANDING. 
THE COURT: ALL R I G H T . 
MR. NASH: ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE HE USED 
WOULD HAVE BROUGHT KIM UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTE. 
THE COURT: ALL R I G H T . 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, I F I MAY, I T WOULD BE 
THE S T A T E ' S RECOMMENDATION I N T H I S THAT NOTHING SHORT 
OF MAXIMUM BE IMPOSED, F I V E TO L I F E I N THE STATE 
P E N I T E N T I A R Y . HE ADMITTED CAUSING THE DEATH OF 
ANOTHER I N D I V I D U A L THAT WAS DONS UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE HAS D E S C R I B E D , A SEVERE BEATING, 
AND I FEEL I T WOULD BE I N APP.ROP.RTATE POR A1-IYTHIU.G 
SHORT O? THE MANDATORY - - O F THE MAXIMUM TO BE 
I M P O S E D . 
Q . (BY THE COURT) WE D I D N ' T ASK YOU THAT, 
I1r>. • ^ n M J i i i j i . V « • « » «. 
YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE POSSIBLE SENTENCE FOR 
THIS. MATTER IS NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS NOR MORE THAN 
YOUR LIFE? 
A. YES. 
Q. IN THE STATE PRISON, TOGETHER WITH A FINE OF 
UP TO $10,000? DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE PENALTIES? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. DOES THAT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO YOUR PLEA 
THAT YOU PREVIOUSLY ENTERED? 
A. NO, SIR. 
THE COURT: ANY REASCH WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE PRONOUNCED? 
MR. NASH: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: WE WOULD LIKE TO ADD A COMMENT 
HERE ABOUT THE FACTS, THAT WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION 
ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED HERE FROM TWO OR THREE PAGES OF 
POLICE REPORTS AND STATEMENTS MADE. 
APPARENTLY MR. GARDNER MET THE VICTIM AT THE 
STORE. MR. GARDNER HAD BEEN DRINKING QUITE HEAVILY 
THAT NIGHT, AND HAVING BEEN SMOKING MARIJUANA, AND WAS 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE DRUGS AT THE TIME THE 
INCIDENT OCCURED.^THEY WENT TO MR. ABEGGLEN'S 
RESIDENCE. MR. ABEGGLEN, ACCORDING TO MR. GARDNER, 

























AND THEN APPARENTLY HE DIED FROM THAT BEATING THAT 
RESULTED THEREFROM. 
THE COURT: IS THAT THE WAY IT HAPPENED? 
THE WITNESS: HE COMMITTED A HOMOSEXUAL ACT 
AGAINST ME, AND I DON'T CARE FOR HOMOSEXUALS. 
THE COURT: THAT CAUSED YOU TO BECOME UPSET? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: WERE YOU ACTING IN THE HEAT -OF 
PASSION"AT THIS TIME? 
THE WITNESS: NO . SIR. I W AS — — 
DID YOU KNOW WHAT YOU WERE DOING 
WHEN YOU WERE KICKING HIM? 
THE WITNESS: NO. I DIDN'T 
THE COURT: MR. NASH? 
MR. NASH: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REPRESENT, AMD 
IT'S IN THE REPORTS BASED UPON THIS, THAT I UNDERSTAND 
MR. FAMULARY RECOMMENDED HIS CLIENT, BASED UPON THIS 
REPORT, THIS PLEA.IS ENTERED. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN, 
AND THERE WAS, AN INITIAL STRIKING. THE VICTIM WAS 
KNOCKED UNCONSCIOUS. THE DEFENDANT THEN HAD TIME TO 
PUT HIS SHOES ON, GO GATHER UP SOME THINGS IN THE 
HOUSE, TAKE SOME PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO THE 
VICTIM, THEN AS THE DEFENDANT WAS GETTING READY TO 
















A CHANCE TO COOL OFF AND REALIZE WHAT WAS GOING ON, 
AND ADMINISTER ANOTHER SEVERE BEATING WHICH RESULTED 
IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. IT WAS NOT DONE IN THIS 
INSTANCE IN THE HEAT OF PASSION. IT IS THE SECOND 
BEATING WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH, AND THESE FACTS HAVE 
BEEN MADE CLEAR TO MR. FAMULARY. THESE ARE THE FACTS 
TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED IN AT 
LEAST TWO STATEMENTS MADE TO POLICE OFFICERS. 
25 
THE COURT: WHICH VERSION IS„THE -TR-U-E—QiVET-
/ ^ MR. FAMULARY: THAT'S BASICALLY CORRECT. THE 
SECOND TIME, FROM WHAT I GATHER FROM THIS POLICE 
REPORT, WAS THE SECOND TIME OF ONE- KICK. IT WASN'T A 
SECOND BEATING. 3UT HE DID HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO 
AROUND AND COLLECT SOME OF THE VICTIM'S BELONGINGS 
'•ttErr-
THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU HAVE 
DESCRIBED TO ME, MR. GARDNER, THE COUNTY ATTORNEY WILL 
HAVE A DIFFICULT .TIME MAKING OUT A CASE OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER? 
THE WITNESS: YES. I JUST DON'T WANT TO TAKE 
IT THROUGH A TRIAL. 
THE COURT: WELL, BUT THE POINT WE HAVE TO 
MAKE, YOU HAVE RIGHTS THAT HAVE TO BE PROTECTED. 




















DEGREE MURDER THIS COURT WON'T ACCEPT A PLEA OF SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. NOW, WHAT THE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DESCRIBED TO ME THE JURY COULD VERY LOGICALLY CONCLUDE 
THAT DOES MEET THE LIMITS OF A SECOND DEGREE MURDER, 
IF THOSE ARE THE FACTS AS THEY OCCURED? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: IT'S STILL YOUR DESIRE TO PLEAD 
GUILTY TO THAT CHARGE? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: ANY REASON WHY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE PRONOUNCED? 
MR. HASH: HO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IN THIS MATTER THE COURT 
SENTENCES MR. GARDNER TO SERVE A TERM AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON, INDETERMINATE, NOT LESS THAN-FIVE YEARS 
AND NOT MORE THAN LIFE. EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE 
WILL BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY. 
MR. NASH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. FAMULARY: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.) 
* * * 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, MILO II. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF 
UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE 
TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THZ SAME WAS 
SUBSEQUENTLY 3Y ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN 
FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 13 BOTH INCLUSIVE; 
AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED? AND 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
THIS 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
DAY OF •_, 1988, AT VERNAL, UTAH. 
JS&£j%. 
MILO N. HARMON, RPR 






DATE 2 / ? / S 5 T I M C _ J M 3 _ PL^ CE ^ f r l / ? ^ * ^ . Hllf
 t /Vtt-TT^_ f 
AND MY AOOHCIS IS , •ftl * c R<* m . fr/^TrK^u^j (>A-a. 
WARNING: i i ro f tE Y O U AWE ASKED ANY OUCSTIONS. YOU MUST UNDEKSTAND YOUR BIGHTS. 
I i m " R J B E E T T * "DflWKJA-Lft of the Vcrna! City Police Department And inform you that 
ft) Y O U H A V I T H E MIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
( I ) IF Y O U G I V E UF THAT RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN AND WILL RE USEO 
AGAINST Y O U IN A COURT OF LAW 
(J) YOU H A V E THE RIGHT TO SPEAK TO AN ATTORNEY BEFORE ANSWERING ANY OUESTIONS. AND 
TO H A V E AN ATTORNEY FRESENT WITH YOU WHILE YOU ANSWER ANY OUESTIONS 
{«) IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD AN ATTORNEY. AN ATTORNEY WILL RE AFTOINTEO FOR YOU »Y THE 
COURT AT NO COST TO YOU, AND YOU NEED NOT ANSWER ANY OUESTIONS UNTIL THAT ATTOR 
NEY HAS SEEN APPOINTED FOR YOU. 
(S) IF YOU DECIOE TO ANSWER OUESTIONS NOW. YOU MAY STOP AT ANY TIME AND ASK TO TALK 
TO AN ATTORNEY BEFORE ANY QUESTIONING CONTINUES 
(ft) IF YOU DECIDE TO STOP ANSWERING OUESTIONS ONCE YOU HAVE BEGUN. ALU QUESTIONING 
WILL STOP. 
WAIVER: I HAVE READ THIS STATEMENT OF MY RIGHTS AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT MY RIGHTS ARE. I AM 
WILL ING TO M A K E A STATEMENT AND WAIVE THESE RIGHTS. I DO NOT WANT A LAWYER PRESENT 
WITH ME D U R I N G THE MAKING OF THIS STATEMENT. I KNOW THAT I MAY REVOKE T H l 4 WAIVER 
AT ANY T I M E D U R I N G THE QUESTIONING AND ASK THAT AN ATTORNEY RE FR ESC NT. fcO PROMISES 
OR T H R E A T S MAVX BEEN MADE TO ME. AND NO PRESSURE OR COERCION OF ARTY K IND HAS BEEN 
USED AGAINST ME 
'X^A^ftV^. ^ P .Xy^rr^t?!^ 
i. DOWNARD: This is an interview with James Franklin Gardner, age 21 year 












Chief Robert T»^Pownard, Vernal City Police Department, Pete<n 
Richard Allen Hawkins, Vernal City Police Department^ *ant ttx + 
John Gardner, no "relation to James, who is the pilot that flei 
to Cortez. Colorado. The time is 1015 hours, the date is the 
8th of March, and the location is the Monte2una County Jail 
breathalyzer room, it's in Cortez. Colorado, Okav Jim where 
we're at we've got, ofcourse we've found Ricky's body, you've 
done quite a bit of talking after this thing and we've got sos 
people on record that have indicated to us you told then what 
h a p p e n e d . W e ' v e g o t R A r n n H h * n r i i n f n r m a n , n n f T g n e c ; < ; t h e n n l l 
person that really knows what happened is you. We've got 
conflicting storiet that there were other people with you 
I H A V E * C A O THIS STATEMENT CONSISTING OF I S 
y}HC FACTS CONTAINED T H E R E I N 
THIS STATEMENT WAS COMPLETED AT 1 0 4 6 M ON THE 8 t h DAT O F . 
WITNESS . 
.PACC(S) AND I A F F I R M TO TMC T R U T H AND ACCURACY OF 
March »». 8 5 





VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF. 
James Franklin Gardner 
GARDNER: Uh, earlier that night. 
You've agreed to talk to me, why donft, (pause), why don't you 
Just start from the beginning, that night when, (pause), when 
you, letfs start from about the time you went to Sherry Richen 
apartment early that afternoon, first time. 
We just partied. 
Who is we? 
Oh, let's see, a whole bunch of people. Sherry Richens, Jeff 
Jaramillo, Robin McCleary, me, Donnie Reed, Clayton Christense 
and Jennifer Thomas I think. 
DOWNARD: Okay. 
GARDNER: Okay we've, was just partying, we'd been partying fox; days, an 
not just smoking dope, beer everything. I went and got ahold < 
a little bit of coke, I was pretty wound up that day. And we 
ran out of beer so I was going to get beer* I pulled into the 
Maverick and I was pretty drunk, I don't even know how come tb< 
lady sold it to me, I couldn't even hardly talk, I was pretty 
drunk. And this guy says hey where's the party, and I said ovi 
here ya know, hey, Ifm, he says I'm easy if anybody wants to 
party as long as they get their beer. And then he ask me what 
my name was so I told him. then he said, he ask me if I knew 
a Trina Gardner and I said yeah, that's my sister. Well, 
apparently he said he used to go out with her at one time and 
we got bull shitting and drinking. We got even worse than I WJ 
everybodys pretty drunk. ' And he was, he said he had some beer 
tis place so we, I figured what the hell ya know. We was, wenl 
over to pick it up. And we got over there and then we listenec 
to about two, three albums I think, sitting, and I figured we 
better get back. The next thing I know, this fucker kisses me 
on the mouth man, and what am I supposed to do. And he, and 
I just never, ya know I've seen this shit happen in Oregon. I 
never been kissed. I had pushed him back and I kicked hin and 
just remember beating him and then I stopped. And he fucking 
wasn't moving man. I tried to get him, I kept pushing his beai 
trying to get his heart going. I give him (nontranscribable) 
mouth to mouth resisitation, I've seen it ya know, never 
practiced it or nothing, but I tried to get him to breath and 
I couldn't do nothing, he just, that was it. His neck started 
swelling up, his bead swelled up, and I got scared, and I mean 
I kept trying to close his eyes and his fucking eyes wouldn't 
close, they kept popping open. And I didn't know what to do, 
I didn't want to get, I didn't want to go back to the pen. 
And at that point I just figured well fuckt let them kill me, 
ya know. I figured I had to get out of it, I didn't know what 
to do. I bad to tell somebody. I had to go tell my mom and da 
WITNESS: *7^T~ ^Df^cr^c^Jf 7 * ^ 3 SIGNED: Hl*+(ScZ\rr 
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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF 
James Franklin Gardng 
GARDNER: I had to go to my sisters house to find enough gas to get up 
there. I never thought it was possible but a person could d< 
itf I never got that mad in my life. I mean It I kicked him 
and when I kicked him I kicked him in the mouth and it went t 
into his nose. And then he started bleeding across here and 
think it was coming out of his eyes or something. I mean my 
foot, I got a bole on the bottom of my foot. 
DOWNARD: Why donft you show that to me. 
GARDNER: Where the skin, it tore the skin off from his teeth. 
DOWNARD: They haven't given you any medical attention for that? 
GARDNER: I stopped in Grand Junction the other night because it was 
swelling up and hurting so bad, and be give me some, a couple 
of tablets for it. For the, well pain and then plus the... 
DOWNARD: Tou went to see a doctor? 
GARDNER: Antibiotics, yeah. I've got the prescriptions out there, I 
just didn't have no money to get them... 
DOWNARD: Do you remember wfcat his name is? 
GARDNER: it's on the things, on the prescriptions. 
DOWNARD: Was it a hospital or just a clinic? 
.GARDNER: It's a hospital. Only one there, Lower Valley or something, 
(nontranscrlbable) Valley or something. I told him I ^ slipped 
on a rock and tut It off. But I had went and told my<46asin 
and now about all I could do was think about running. L^fiidn 
know what to do, I was scared to death man. I still, *H jflonft 
know, it seems like a dream. I never thought it was possible 
I mean I've been in fights and that's rediculous man, but I d 
think that I could ever kill somebody. 
DOWNARD: Let me ask you a few questions. Let's get back to, it might 
not be easy to talk about but it's something we're going to 
have to get into. Alright your livid with him then, you met 
him early after you started your party, you'd been partying 
with Reed and them people. 
GARDNER: Because Donnie come over that day, yeah. He bad, we went out 
and got two cases of beer from... 
DOWNARD: From Maverick? 
GARDNER: Yeab. 
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Or no, I don't think it was at Maverick. It might have been at 
the Triangle where I bought the beer first but then I went bad 
up and got some more, (pause) at that was the Maverick. 
And that's where you met Abegglen? Did you know him before 
this? 
No, never met him, never seen him or nothing. It's just we 
got talking and he used to go out with my sister he said. 
Okay, and be basically mentioned Trina Gardner? 
Yeah, be said her name and I said yeah, that's my sister. My 
sister, she's a model so, I don't know, ya know, it's... 
After you met Abegglen, where did you go? 
Over to Sherry Richens. 
You went back to Richens'. And from Richens', what happened? 
.We just sit there and bull shitted for a little while. 
Then bow did you leave Richens'? 
In bis car. 
In bis car? Where you ever with him in the red Fiero? 
I'm trying to think, I don'.t remember if he was driving, 
riding in it, I, I don't remember. It seems to me he might 
have rode in it because I was driving it, that was Donnies. 
But I don't remember if be rode in it or not. 
When you left, (pause) when you left that night with him, what 




You don't recall driving over to Michele Aguilars? 
Yeab I do, because that's when Micbele, he did ride in it 
because we went up there to pick up Donnie and then we went 
back and we parked the car and Michele took us back to, (pause) 
•he took us back over to Sherrys and that's because, that's rig 
SIGNED /ZAWSCltff>T~ 
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that's where his oar was. 
You've ultimately though ended up with, (pause) at Abegglens? 
Yeah. 
Who was there? 
Ilichele and them was for a minute and they, they left and he wa 
just supposed to get beer if I, that I recollect. And then we 
listened to a couple of albums of his and then that's when that 
other thing happened. I don't even remember bow many times I 
bit him or nothing, all I remember is just, I kicked him and I 
remember bitting on him. 
And you bad your shoes off at that time? 
Yeah. I'd bad tennis shoes on and they was wet. 
You bad shoes on at that time? 
Huh, me? No, I bad tennis shoes on and my feet, I remember my 
feet freezing and I, because I took them off as soon as ;I got 
in there so I di&a't get mud all over bacsuse they was isuddy 
and wet. .But, I'm trying to think, I can't remember because 
they had blood all over them when I got back over there and 
Sherry went and washed them for me. I ask ber to throw 
everything in the washer. 
You kicked bim -with this foot down bere? 
Yeah. 
Karate kick? 
Pretty much, yeab. 
You've used the term jammed when you indicate how you struck 
bim in the nose, explain to me what that means to you? 
Jim? 
Jammed. You said you jammed bim. 
I just jumped up and kicked bim. 
You didn't bit bim first? 
I kicked bim first. 
And tben you bit bim? 
SIGNED: /&A4SC?./?T~ 
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James Pranklin fiarHnai 
GARDNER: And then, yeah. 
DOWNARD: How did you hit him? 
GARDNER: With my fist. 
DOWNARD: It wasn't an open palm but like that? 
GARDNER: Nof it's my fist. And I remember I know I kicked him and wh€ 
I kicked him..• 
DOWNARD: Did you ever use any kind of a weapon? 
GARDNER: No. I know that for a factf I'd never do something like that 
DOWNARD: Didn't use any numbchucks or anything like that? 
GARDNER: No, I've worked with them but If Ifd never used them, never 
used it. No weapon at all, I know that for a fact. . I don't 
remember alot of it, it was scary. 
DOWNARD: Okay after you'd given up on the CPR and knew he was dead, yo 
decided to..• 
GARDNER,; Run. I had to, I had to go tell my mom and dad something. 
DOWNARD: Did you have to put your shoes on? 
GARDNER: I don't remember. All I can remember is I think I locked the 
door and I ran out and just left. 
DOWNARD: After you put your shoes on, did you go back over and stomp 
on him? 
GARDNER: 1 don't know. 
DOWNARD: You don't know? 
GARDNER: No I don't. I, I might have, put it that way I had blood on 
my tennis shoes. (nontranscribable) he was, okay this was 
even after
 f I know I quit or something, and be was laying 
there and he was breathing still, but his choke, it sounded 
like he was choking on his blood or something. And I remerabe. 
I kicked him because he kept trying to get up once, and then 
he just didn't move man. His eyes opened, I kept trying to 
close his eyes and they wouldn't fucking close. They kept 
opening up. 
DOWNARD: When you kicked him, did you have your shoes on or not? 
GARDNER: I don't know. 























~ VOLUNIAHV SI*TEMENT OR ' 
James Praikljp fardn* 
When be t r i e d to r a i s e up? 
I don' t know. 
Let me summarize what you've just told me and you tell me..* 
I think I, I might have. 
You had your shoes on when you kicked him? 
Because I think I was getting ready to go or something. 
And he started to rise up and you kicked him again. 
Yeah. 
So you, you*re telling me bow this thing went down and... 
That I can think of right now, that I remember. 
Well you'll have some time to think about it and we*11 talk 
again when we get back to Vernal, but I wantf (pause), it's 
important that I understand what happened. You were there 
alone with him and basically what you*re saying has triggered 
you is thexfact that the oome up and give you a kiss alright* 
Any man that would have »ny class about himself, I .figure 
would do something about it. I don't, I've never cartd for 
queers or anything like that. I've seen this shit. 
And then you kicked him, Is that when the pieo# came out 
of your loot? 
Yeah. 
Did that... 
It had to be because I don't remember, I didn't, I don't 
remember feeling it because it wasn't even until long after 
that because a piece of meat was hanging off my foot when I 
got over to Jeff Jaramillos house. And I remember I took my 
knife out because it was in the bedroom and I cut that piece 
of meat off because it was dangling there. 
Alright, then you beat him about the head and shoulders and 
you just can't remember how many times? 
I don't remember really beating him, I remember beating on 
bim but I don't know what... 
Would you, would It take you... 
SIGNEO: /&A+tScJZiPT 
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All I remember is I was mad and then... 
Bow much time did it take you? 
I don't know. 
Would you say you bit him more than ten times, less than ten 
times? 
I have no idea. I don't know. I know I kicked him a couple 
of times, but the first time, it knocked him down. 
Then you went and got your shoes on, right? 
I think I was getting ready to go yes. 
And at that point in time, he started to raise back up? 
Yeab. 
Ar»d then you kicked him? 
I remember kicking him, yeah. I'm pretty sure I kicked him 
in the ribs or I kicked him in the neck( ghat's right. I 
kicked him in the neck. 
On, do you remember which side? You were standing closest 
to the door... 
I think It was this side because he was up on his knees. 
(Indicating right 6ide) 
And you kicked him again. 
Yeah because I was on that, this side of him and I kicked 
him over here, (nontranscribable) I don't, and I don't know 
if I kicked him after that or not. 
You don't remember if you kicked him after that? 
No. 
Alright. And then you left after that? 
I think, yeah. 
When did you do the CPR you mentioned? 
It was after, well I had left, it was after that because when 
be quit breathing be quit moving. 
7Z T D^TuSUJU^. A ^ 3 SIGNED: I^A^SCfilPT 
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DOWNARD: It was after you kicked him a second time when be was trying 
to get up? 
GARDNER: Yeah, before I left at all. He quit and I got really scared 
man, I jumped down and I started pushing on his chest-.. 
DOWNARD: Real hard? 
GARDNER: Trying to get his heart beating again. 
DOWNARD: Did you push hard and then, but not giving it alot of umph. 
GARDNER: Yeah. 
DOWNARD: Did you ever hear anything crack or feel anything give when 
you were pushing on his heart? 
GARDNER: Oh, not that I know of, no... 
DOWNARD: When you used CPR? Did you ever do mouth to mouth? 
GARDNER: Yeah once, and then I had blood on my face and oh, I went 
and washed that off. 
DOWNARD: So you left the apartment? 
GARDNER: And then I went over to, straight to Sherrys because Bill was 
there, I knew he was there aad I had, (pause) I ask for help 
and the only thing he could tell me was just you better go 
tell my dad, and that's where I went, I had to anyways. And 
then I went over from there, I went to the police station 
that next morning and I sat there for about an hour and not 
needing that, but I sat there and I just couldn't bf*ing 
myself to go in there. 
DOWNARD: Over to the police station, where*s that at? 
GARDNER: In Vernal. The Sheriff's Office. 
DOWNARD: The Sheriffs Office. 
GARDNER: And I just, I wasn*t right there at it, I was up the road and 
I just couldn't bring myself to go in there. Because I told 
my dad I was going to go turn myself in, and then I just 
started driving. I don't remember alot of even driving. I was 
drinking all the way. And I got down here to Towoak and I 
was talking to Benjamin Murray which is kind of my adopted 
brother and be calmed me down a little bit, and I just, 
well as a matter of fact I was coming up to turn myself in. 
And I took a shower and shaved, changed my clothes and I was 
coming, just getting ready to come up when they, the Tribal 
WITNESS: **/"" ^U-.~v^-/ Z^** 


















VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF 
James Franklin Gardnpr 
police arrested me. Because God... 
When you got to Sherrys house that night you had a bag of coin 
They were a plastic bag, several francs and pesos in them, whe 
did you get that money? 
That night? That morning I went and got some. 
Where from? 
From Russell Don Hendricks, my cousin, because I'd, I explaine 
to him what happened and X Just had, had to. It was, I mean I 
didn't mean to do it, and he give me some, a whole bunch of 
money. He said all it was was change because it was in a 
plastic bag and I guess that's it, ya know. He says James, 
the best thing you can do is turn yourself in, he says and it' 




help. And that's what I bought my beer with the 
And my aunt went and give me ten dollars. 
Avis. 
Okay, you took Bicky's car? 
"Yes. 
Tour dad thinks that you got that car from Hendricks in Maeser 
No, I told him that. 
You told him that? 
Teab. I had, I was going to buy this car ia the first place, 
because it wasn't that bad of shape and he only wanted like 
$500.00 for it. 
When did you, bad you driven it, test driven it? 
Yes. I test drove it that night, long before that. And, well 
right after I first met him because that's, ya know, I got 
talking, well we got talking about his car and I was going to 
buy it but I was waiting for my check from the Insurance form. 
So, where had you driven the car while it was for a test drive 
Right there in Vernal, it's Just over, well we talked about i1 
slot at Sherrys when we left there in the car and then I 
drove It over to his bouse. 
PAGE 11 
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DOWNARD: So you discussed buying the car? 
GARDNER: Yesf I wanted, well I wanted to buy it. 
DOWNARD: Then when you left the residence that night you Just took the 
car because you needed the transportation? 
GARDNER: Yeah. 
DOWNARD: Did you take anything out of the house when you left? 
GARDNER: If I think I tried to get some groceries or something, but 
there wasn't none in the car. 
DOWNARD: Where are your numbchucks at? 
GARDNER: I didn't have none. I'd used them but that's from people I 
borrowed from. 
DOWNARD: You don't have a set that's yours? 
GARDNER: No. These is just... 
DOWNARD: I whole other set? 
GARDNER: No, I don't have none. These are store bought ones, I didn't 
use them and everybody used to (nontranscribable) he keeps them 
I just use them there, at his bouse. 
DOWNARD: Where's your buddy? 
GARDNER: I can't tell you that, you'd go take them. 
DOWNARD: Donnie Reed? 
GARDNER: No. Donnie Reed used to have some but I broke them. It was 
a home made set because I taped one. I broke the string in 
between them. I worked alot with... 
DOWNARD: You told atleast six people that you were at a poker party 
playing poker. 
GARDNER: We wasn't playing poker but it was, it was over at Sherrys 
there first, we was all partying, having a few beers and 
stuff. And then I remember because Jeff kept telling them, 
be said, hey man, you guys got to quiet down because there's 
kids upstairs trying to get to sleep. Sherry's little girl. 
DOWNARD: So the beating didn't take place at a poker party? 
GARDNER: 
WITNESS: 
No. I don't know what I all said, I was scared and I mixed 
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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF 
James Franklin Gardner 
GARDNER: alot of things up. I still, I know that but, not that much. 
I've thought about it and it's Just puttingt like ya know, I 
was up damn near all night last night thinking about it. It's 
not something a person can get out of his head. 
DOWNARD: We talked to your Aunt Berta yesterday in the Vernal Post 
Office, did you send her in to go get your check? 
GARDNER: Who? 
DOWNARD: Your Aunt Berta Rasmussen? 
GARDNER: Berta? 
DOWNARD: Is that her name? She lives in Roosevelt, her name is Berta 
Rasmussen. 
GARDNER: I don't know no Berta Rasmussen. 
DOWNARD: You were there four o'clock in the morning at her house? 
GARDNER: Evelda? 
DOWNARD: Okay, Evelda. 
GARDNER: That's my sister. 
DOWNARD: Oh it's your sister. 
GARDNER: Yes I did. I wanted my -.check. 
DOWNARD: So that's where she was going, tfauat's why she was in Vernal 
Post Office, Just trying to pick up your check there? Is that 
GARDNER: Yeah, because I had to, I wanted to get some money, keep some 
money to get me where, atleast where I was going or something. 
Or even cigarettes in jail or, and I know my other sister she 
needed some money pretty bad because they was broke. 
DOWNARD: How come you didn't get some medical help for this guy? 
GARDNER: What are you going to do man, I tried to help. Fucker was 
dead, he was laying there, I couldn't do nothing, I was scared. 
This is not something, when you're this, that scared it's not, 
I mean I kept thinking I should but I couldn't do it. All I 
could think about was running man. I kept thinking about that 
forty foot wall up there. 
DOWNARD: Is Salem, Oregon where you did your time? 
GARDNER: Yeab. ^ 
WITNESS: /?7^~ *7buSUJ24 C0. f ^ S SIGNED: "TzA+lSCfr P7~ 
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What was that for? 
Auto theft and a whole bunch of different little shit. 
Nothing bad. 
You ever done any other hard time? 
Jails. State school, boys homes. 
Okay, why don't you show me your tattoos. 
I got them all over. 
I know. Start with this hand right here, put your hand up 
and let me look at it. You've got a dot... 
Nontranscribable the knuckles. 
What r*re they, just dots? 
Yeah. 
On each knuckle? 
Yeah. 
And there's one right in the center of them nontranscribable... 
night there used to be a scorpion, I f s faded out. I got 
two cross, half done crosses on ay arm. 
Anything else on this arm? 
No. 
What do you got on your chest? Just set that stuff right here. 
Got a rose here, and some little fuzzy man there and this 
here, nontranscribable with a heart. 
Furry man, fuzzy man? 
Yeab. 
A broken heart? 
Okay, I've got a tattoo on by back. 
@ ^ > 
Where did you get that done at? C**M€*-' ©*««»* ^ 
ilTl\^AhM^cX , P # = 3 SIGNED: T&WSCZ.&T 
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James Franklin Gardner 
GARDNER: Oregon pen. 
DOfNARD: Not a bad job* Nontranscribable. 
GARDNER: It's a prison tower with a hand I guess. 
DOWNARD: Left shoulder, you got anything on your left shoulder? 
GARDNER: No. 
DOWNARD: Left, nothing up around here? 
GARDNER: No. 
DOWNARD: Left forearm? 
GARDNER: Broken heart. Initials V.E.N. 
DOWNARD: D.E. or E. 
GARDNER: £. 
DOWNARD: N? 
GARDNER: Plus that hand underneath it. 
DOWNARD: What does that mean? 
GARDNER: That's for a girl, that*s... 
DOWNARD: Left wrist. 
GARDNER: Those are dots all over it, virgin. Okay, nontranscribable 
my hand. 
DOWNARD: Okay, nontranscribable questions Rick? 
HAWKINS: Not right now. 
DOWNARD: We can sit down and get more, more on the death on this, give 
you a chance to, we've probably refreshed your memory a little 
bit, haven't we? 
GARDNER: Yeah. 
DOWNARD: When we get back tomorrow, we'll sit back down, it's 
important that you get your, your side of the story on 
record to medicate anything that... 
GARDNER: I've got alot of friends out that they might be trying to 
cover me on exactly what happened, I'm telling you exactly 
WITNESS: *?*T~ JJALATVVULJI *^*^X ct/s*.*f*. TS>i^r^t> r ^ 
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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF: 
James Frankly Gardner 
GARDNER: what happened, I just want to get it over with. My God I 
didn't mean to kill the man. 
DOVNARD: Take your cigarettes back now. About right after lunch, wefll 
go to court and youf11 have the opportunity to waive about 
extradition. Do you intend to do that? 
GARDNER: Yes. 
DOWNARD: Okayf we'll get home and get this thing going. This 
statement 
present. 
concludes at 1046 hours, same date, same people 
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SEND TO: UINTA'? COin:TY ATTORKT* 
VFifcVAL PQLICF DEPARTHLUT 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINER 
44 Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 
CAUSE OF DEATH 
Date: ? / fi / fl5 rVI.E. Case No. R^0?AB 
Name of deceased: I,nF.nnT,mf F.icJ: 1>i;np 
Residence of deceased: HO North 500 West $3 Vernal 
Found *t:Same &s above 
A postmortem examination was performed and the cause of death is Mn7Mpi#g nrtminnr>r<Bhr»l "injuries 
Rlttnt fnrrr tmum* tn thn hend 
Manner of death: D Accident 
Q Natural Causes 
ED Suicide E Homicide 
• Undetermined 
Pending O Reason: 
Medical Examiner 
Note: D Please send this office a copy of the Investigation report. 
Q Piease send this office a copy of the Hospital record. 
SDH-OME-20 7/79 
STATE Or UTAH 
OFI'ICE Of THE f':T)KAI. IX^l-l R 
AUTOPSY R! PORT 
Case Wo: S5-024S 
N:.ir\e:ABEGGLER, Rick R. 
Date and time of death: 3/6/85 - 2015 
EXTERNAL EXAIAJl^AJIO^ 
The body is that of a clothed, unembalmed adult cavcasion male who is cool to the touch 
with his hands paper-bagged. The decedent is clothed in a short-sleeved .Tzzoor: knit 
shirt, blue jeans, and black socks. Blood stains pit noted on the face :';;• voicing zhe 
bridge of the nose, right cheek, and base of th.- t.-r^trils appearing io b^ c.:^p.ating fic-~ 
the :.iouth or nostrils. The body weight is 53 kg . -no the height is 166 cr.. The head .'-* . 
cephalic and covered by auburn-brown hair. The irides are brown and the pupils ar^ ?o:;;.J 
and equal. The sclerae are clear with slight postmortem drying. Upper r.;;«d low^r natu.r* 
teeth are present. The thorax is symmetrical and normally-shaped; The br'ir:s are :.:•-
able. The abdomen is flat with a 14 cm midline epigastric scar and a 1.5 c. : ight ::: * 
quadrant scar. External genitalia arc unremarkable. The anus is unremavkah'^. rhere :s 
purple dependent lividity on the right side of tlie face. There .is postmojt&r crying of : *-
rcvo'-urn. Othei wise, purple liver mortis is dorsal and th'.-rt* is 2+ rigor :.o» c :'^  or : .V. 
;•: - •'iries. 7L::-^ : "<-.".•; r:>rt~s of the jaw is present. The left lower qu:-d:^:iz of t;JK 
'• ". : ^':.^-\-'s c.r. ,;:TJ O: T .'C gi c-en postrtorter diycoloi ation. There are no petechial 
::: . r
 : s of i hi bulbar ^^njurictivae. 7he left lower pal p-hral conjunctiva shows 3 
^inchiai heu.onhages. The ricjjz uppc-r palpebral, right lower palpebral r.nc lift upper 
palpebral conjunctiva show no petechial hemorrhages. Numerous pezechiae are noted cf : \ 
upper buccal mucosa in association with contusions and abrasions of the lip regions. 
DESCRIPTION OF EVIPENCE REMOVED FROM THE BODY 
The following items of evidence were removed prior to the autopsy incision: Hair samples 
from the moustache, head, axilla, chest, and pubic regions; loose hairs taken from 
the maroon T-shirt; a swab for blood from the mouth i-gion; material removed from betw<
 t 
the teeth by the forensic odontologist, Dr. Fitzgerald; fingernail clippings; gunshot 
residue of the h'^nds; rectal swab, smear, and washings; and oral smear, swab, and washinc 
During the autopsy, blood for group type and toxicology and fingerprints are obtained. 
Following the autopsy, dental impressions of the decedents teeth are obtained by 
Dr. Fitzgerald, forensic odontologist. 
WITNESSES TO THE AUTOPSY 
The autopsy is witnessed by Detective Paul Parker and Officer Dave Gruys, Vernal Police 
Department. 
SPECIMENS BROUGHT IN BY THE POLICE 
H single fragment of apparent human tissue showing skin-ridge pattern and measuring 
2.8 X 1.3 cm in diameter by 2 mm in thickness is brought in by the police to be submitted 
in evidence. 
Age: 28 Race: White S<?x: Kale 
D.ite and time of autopsy: 3/7/85 - 1300 
r-,=:
 2 
AI'.rJlCll.R, F-'ck N. 
r.:.r Wo: 
i,} SCFJF; JUN_ <,r L>:r};}^:ALCLrjA:if:qus ^gkP.iPS^jxiJpp Jir^p ^ 'P^JOK_ 
•There is a paipible fracture of the nasal bones with a .3 X .4 cm recent red-brown abrasic 
of the bridge of the nose. The configuration of the face is sorrewhat distoried by soft 
tissue swelling of the left jaw region and right cheek. Patterned bruises are noted of t'l: 
right side of the head in the right temple and the right preauricular region. There are 2 
parallel somewhat zig-zag-shape-d pink ecchymotic striations of the right temple anterior 
to the hair-line covering an area of 1.5 cm in vertical by .5 cm in anterior-posterior 
direction; each striation measures less than 1 mm in width. Anterior to the right ear 
is ^n area of icjghly parallel pink-purple ecchymotic striations which, individually, have 
a slight zig zag i-aztcrn and appear to be consistent with the tread of the sole of a 
jogging or athletic shoe or similar instrument. The upper edge of this area is located 15 
below the top of the head and its r edial edge is 10 cm to the right of the anterior midlin 
It covers a total area of 3.5 cm in antero-posterior direction by 6.5 cm in vertical direc 
tion and consists of approximately C icughly parallel striations, each of which measure vp 
1 to 2 JTJTI in width and with an 3';j. of 3 to 4 mm spared skin between each striation. The 
right ear is somewhat swollen and shows a severe purple ecchymosis over an area of 6 cm 
in vertical by 3 cm in antero-poszerior direction with superimposed patchy recent red-
brown abrasions. Inferior to the lobe of the right ear is a purple lecent ecchymosis 
measuring 3X1 cm in d:' amezer. 7'Jra right cheek shows an area of blue-prink ecchymosi s 
and soft tissue swelling measuring approxir.ately 8 cm in diameter. Super-in j-o.-ed upon 
this ecchymotic area is a recent red-brown abrasion of the right cheek over an area of 
3 cr-: The right ralar r< gion .-' kr . ~ . . f. l\ .2 cr. i •. cent i >.-d-i>i cwn abrasion at'the lateral 
•eg. ef a ilaz .: r." \:si or. > " r:" "' * • . " : "~ of ' hr r'ck*- J •*•-.-= r oyelic reasurlng 
3.5 cm in horizonzal by 1 c: In • . . •'. >,:'•;- \n. A: the c^ter c.nzh::s o: :h<=- right 
*ye is a 1.3 X .5 cr rec-rz bis: :z. ,-s . s. A.z the c::ter c :'nvhus of -.k: '1 ~: ^ --ye is a 
1.5 cm recent blue ecchyr osis. J r-. • * ":•: superior forehead shows an area of J very ia~'r.: 
delicate linear contusions wizh a sl^gkz zig zag pattern, each of which measures less :kar. 
1 mm in width and are separated by less than 1 mm; the total area measures .5 cm in ho: i-
zontal by .8 cm in vertical direction. Slightly medial to this somewhat patterned lesior. 
justbelow the hairline of the right forehead, is a 1.5 cm pale pink recent ecch:-r. osis. 
ala nasi bilaterally show 2.5 X .6 cm pink abraded ecchymoses. The left cheek shows an 
area of patchy pink recent abraded ecchymoses measuring 9 cm in anterior-posterior by 
5 cm in vertical direction. The right chin and right jaw region shows an area of recent 
pink-brown abrasion measuring 7 cm in horizontal by 3 cm in vertical direction. At the 
left outer angle of the mouth, is a superficial cut wound or laceration measuring .7 cm 
in length by .3 cm in depth. Zhe a her injuries to the mouth are as follows: a 1 X 1.5 cm 
blue ecchymosis of the lateral corner of the inner aspect of the left upper lip with two 
superficial lacerations up to .7 cm in length by .1 cm in depth; a 1.5 X .8 cm red-brown 
abrasion of the mid upper lip; a 3 X 1 cm blue recent ecchymosis of the inner aspect of t 
right upper lip; a .8 cm red-brown abrasion and a 1.2 cm blue ecchymosis of the left 
lateral lower lip; and two blue-purple ecchymoses of the inner aspect of the mid lower 
lip which measure .5 and 1.2 cm in diameter. There is a confluent lesion involving the 
left mandibular ramus, angle of the left jaw, left ear lobe, and post-auricular region; 
this lesion has a total area of 13 cm in anterior-posterior and horizontal direction 
by 3.5 cm in vertical direction and consists of the following lesions: a 2 X 1.6 cm 
recent red-brown abrasion of the left external ear lobe; a slightly curved recent red-
brown abrasion posterior to the left ear lobe measuring 2 cm in vertical by .8 cm in 
horizontal direction; a recent red-brown abrasion inferior to the left external ear lobe 
measuring 2.7 cm in diameter; anterior to this abrasion and extending towards the midline 
is a pink abraded ecchymosis with soft tissue swelling measuring 6.5 cm in horizontal by 
u n rst.nc nno A -r/-m 
Name: /•*i-.<;GL.ER, Pick R. 
5 cm in vortical direction; and a recent rciatch of the left jaw ;:.•--.- -• :ng .9 nr: jri 
.ertical by .1 cm in horizont al direction. In addition, the entire left external car 
shows an extensive recent phi pie c-cclrgmosi s measuring 6 cm in vertical by 3 cm in .;.-/;•:•-; :*or-
posterior direction. 
DESCRIPTION OF INTERVAL CRAN1AL_ CEREBRAL Jl^VRlES^ 
The scalp is reflected in the usual fashion. The fol lowing at^as of acute dark red iednt 
hemorrhage are noted: 1. An area of hemorrhage of the left posterior occipital scalp and 
galea which J measures 3 cm in diameter of the galea by 1 IUX in thickness and 2 <_""< of the ~ca 
by 1 man in thickness; 2. Hemorrhage of the l^ft post(:i ior terporal scalp and galea ;:.«< v:>;;7* 
ing 2X3 cm in diameter; 3. Hemoi rhage of the right lateral parietal scalp arid galea 
measuring 4 X 3 cm in diameter by 1 rjv in thick::".- ss; 4. Eemo:'rhage of the rich: paste:: c y 
temporal scalp and gale, a r ~ . - ur ing 3.5 cm in el* •:•; .: ter; 5. He mo* ? hage- of r he ? : chz lateral 
temporal scalp and right terporal muscle r.-asui ' ^c 4X3 cm in d':reter by 2 ~c 5 ." in 
thickness. 
%n old skull defect is noted of the left fiontc-varietal skull r?~ z.su: ir.c 4 X 5 .:r :'. r. 
jiameter, which is oval and covered by apparent plastic. Tin re art no either '- •':' res --" 
the base or calvari urn of _ the_ skul^. The dura is smooth and opaque and szj.ips • .~:.y; *. ".. 
is a diffuse liquid, dark red subdural hematoma over the bil ateral cerebral convey: tie- s ~: d 
extendi ng into the bil ateral ant erior, middle, and posterior cranial fessaef }.--•-:'. :g 
volume of approximately 30 cc and measuring 1 to 2 mm in thickness. ?h~ car a' .- *. 
intent. There is slight clouding of the leptor.-ninges over the- ' it sv:r:c: :. 
eirtex where there is an old chronic surgical defect and foca' a * -.• = c: e./ric' 
.ng 5 X 4 cm in di£.::eter by 1.5 cm in deptfy. The uncerly'r-: e- -.y ' . r -.-: • -..-•.. 
left parietal lobe is slightly softened and tan in color s^: *e::\dJng ti\ c'.c -::: -* 
There are no other chronic contusions noted of the brain. The cerebrospinal fluid ;'.-
2nd colorless. The fresh brain weighs 1,390 grams and shows generally symmetric hi 
ie mi spheres with the exception of the left parietal cortex. There is moderate flatter.': 
yf the gyri and narrowing of the sulci throughout. There is niodeiate cerebellar-tonsr. 1 i 
herniation. There is no noticeable hippocampal-uncal herniation. No midline shift is ::v -
"he brain stem and cerebellum are otherwise normally disposed. Cranial nerves 1 through 12 
ire intact. The arteries at the base have a normal distribution and are free of obstruct i c: 
\neurysm, or anomaly. There is patchy subarachnoid hemorrhage over the cerebella vermis, 
lerial sections of brain, brain stem, and cerebellum demonstrate the focal area of cortical 
oss of the superior left parietal cortex described above which appears to be of chronic 
fature. There are, in addition, small fuci of acute cerebral contusion involving the inf^r. 
•urface of the left temporal lobe,' the right parahippocampal gyrus, and the left hippocampu: 
>ach of which measures up to 3 to 4 mm in diameter by 2 mm in depth and are purple-blue in 
-olor. They9re associated with minimal overlying subarachnoid hemorrhage. There are no 
'ilpable fractures of the cervical spine. 
DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES TO THE NECK AND SHOULDER REGIONS 
he right anterior neck shows a 2.3 X .2 cm horizontally oriented recent red-brown abrasion 
ocated 2 cm above the medial head of the right clavicle. On the medial edge of the right 
terno cleido mastoid muscle and extending distal ly to the medial head of the right clavich 
s a pink recent abraded ecchymosis measuring 6 cm in vertical-obl ique by 2.5 cm in horizon 
Irection. In the midline of the jugular notch is a 1.5 cm pink recent abraded ecchymosis. 
n the left anterior neck at the medial edge of the middle third of the left sternocleidom-
astoid ntuscle is a pale pink recent ecchumosis mr-a^urinn 1 ^ r*™ ^ *r<*r+*~*i v>„ I c ^ m . ~ -
Nv.uz :}.•';'.:J.KR, h \:k R. Oss No: S
r 
ai.ed 1 cm to the loft of ih< >ni or ior ' *1 : irizontal direction; ihis bruise is 
ihe level of the cricoid cartilage. Just above the medial he'id of the Teft cla\ 
1.5 cm recent pink-red abraded occhyi.,osjs. Over the medial head of the left cl~s icle is a 
2 X .6 cm horizontal recent red-brown abraded ecchymosis. Just below the left irlavicle in 
the midclavicular line is a recent oval pink ecchymosis measuring 3.5 cm in vertical by 
2.5 cm in a horizontal direction. Treated on the left anterolateral neck is a 4 X 4 cm 
pink recent ecchymosis with a super-imposed slight red abrasion measuring 1.5 X .6 cm; tin 
medial edge of this lesion is located 3 cm to the left of the midline and its upper edge 
ds 25 cm below the lop of the head. Just posterior to this contusion involving ''he left 
supraclavicular fossa and the left lateral neck ds an extensive area of multiple d:rk pur p. 
linear ecchyr.ioses measuring up to 2 run in horizontal width; the area of these non-specr r : c 
linear ecchymoses is 10 cm in vertical direction by 5.5 cm in antero-posterior direction; 
there is a surrounding zone of recent pink contusion measuring 13 cm in vertical by 6 cm ;•/ 
ar.l~:o-pesterior direction extending upward toward the left post-auricular legion. The 
right posterior neck shews a recent pink-biown abrasion measuring 2 cm in hoiizonzal by 
.? cm in vertical direction. The right superior and lateral shovld-rv region chows a r-.-c. "•: 
zed-brown abrasion mezsuring S cm in vertical by 3 cm in antero-posic rior d' ruction. ' ."£ 
left superior and anterior shoulder region shows a recent red-brown abrasion measuring 6 
<r, hr. orizontal by 2.5 cm in antero-posterior direction. The anterior left shoulder shews 
'se- vur. \e ecchymosis measuring 3 cm in vertical by .8 cm
 :
n horizontal *direel 
•)ESCFIPTlON OF INTERNAL INJURIES TO THE NECK ORGANS 
of the neck shows moderate hi lateral morrhaoe into the sterno 
*
 ;. : :•'•;'" rs. rhere is siight hemorrhage into the szrav muscles on the left. The 
.--; . .•.".?>* .: *•: r the isthmus of the thyroid gland -^:f the cricoid cartilage in 
z:<e ridiir.e. Ar'zez reiuoval of the n-ck organs, acute dark red hc=:^o:: hage is noted in the 
anterior spinous ligaments of the cervical spine. There are no fractures of the hyoid 
bone or superior or inferior cornua of the thyroid cartilages. There are no fractures 
of the cricoid carti1 age. The laryngeal mucosa is tan and smooth without evidence of pa:e 
or petechial hemorrhages. There are no contusions of the posterior pharyngeal wall. Ihe 
thyroid gland is otherwise unremarkable. The tongue is unremarkable without trauma or hi 
marks. There is no foreign material in the airway. No pre-existing lesion is noted in 
the neck, neck organs, or tongue. There i s no abnormal mobility or fracture crepitus of 
the cervical spine. 
DESCRIPTION OF CUTANEOUS INJURIES TO THE TRUNK REGION 
The right lower anterior thorax shows a recent pink dry abrasion measuring .8 cm. The 
posterior left flank shows a recent red abrasion measuring 1.5 cm in vcrtical-oblique by 
,6 cm dn horizontal direction. 
DESCRIPTION OF CUTANEOUS INJURIES TO THE UPPER EXTREMITIES 
'he posterior right upper arm shows a .7 cm tan perimortem abrasion. The dorsum of 
he right first and second fingers show brown healing abrasions measuring up to .3 cw in 
Jiameter with peripheral fibrosis. The dorsum of the left wrist shows 2 recent red-brown 
brasions measuring .5 and .6 cm in diameter and located medially. The posterio-medial 
Cspect of the left forearm shows a .6 X .3 cm recent red-brown abrasion. 
7c:ue: A \--t "(..V ;.ER, Pick R. C.v-2 No:,
c
 5-f>.?'£ 
0FSCR1PTION OF JJfjyRJES ,0 J/UE_JBI]_.\ :"RAL LOWER EXTREM1TIES 
"he medial aspect of the right thigh adjacent to the scrotum shows a 1.5 cm pink-orange 
-ecent ecchymosis. The right anterior thigh shows a recent dry pink-brown abrasion 
measuring 5 cm in vertical by 2.5 cm in horizontal direction. 
INTERNAL EXAMINATION 
30DY CAVITIES: The midline abdominal fat measures 1 cm in thickness. The pleural cavities 
are free of fluid or adhesions. There are no fractures of the ribs. The lungs are well 
expanded. The pericardial sac contains a scanty amount of serous fluid and has smooth, 
shiny surfaces. The abdominal cavity is free of fluid or evidence of trauma or peritonitis 
The retroperitonc-um is unremarkable. The organs have their usual positions and relation-
ships. 
tECK ORGANS: See description of injuries. 
:ARDIOVASCVLAP SYSTEM: The heart weighs 290 grams and has the usual configuration without 
dilatation, hyp-:-rii ophy, or congeni t :1 ..'*:n:,al it s. The valves are thin, pliable,*and rcrr ' 
structured with nc:mal circumferences and delicate chordae tendineae. The right main 
Toronary artery is dominant. The coionr.ry arteries have normal branchings and patent 
istia and are widely patent. The left v nuicle re:.sv:es 1.3 and the right, 0.4 cm in 
thickness; the myocardium is firm. end r: .1-1 '~: -v: :•.-;'r:. :••.*" "'* 'yc~ ion or fibrosis. 
r}je endocardium is smooth and transl ucer.t. She ac: zi .- . ; . . ; - : . * c^li: .? r:nd elasticity 
'id is lined by smooth yellow inz...a. :";:•: ;:aje: ':.' '.. ' y a:. :\''::-wa:2ed and 
widely patent. 
1ESPIRATORY SYS'lEK: The right lung -weighs 650 grams and the left, 500 grams. The pleural 
surfaces are smooth. The parenchyma of both lungs is dark pink, wet, and rubbery with 
3+ congestion and 3+ edema. There is no consolidation or nodularity on cut surfaces. 
The small bronchi contain tan liquid. The pulmonary arteries are lined by smooth 
tan intima and are widely patent. 
GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM: The esophagus, stomach, and small and large intestine are of 
lormal caliber and lined by intact, tan mucosa. The stomach contains about 250 cc of 
tan liquid and partially-digested food particles and shows normal rugal folds without 
jlcers. Recognizeabie residuals of medications are not present. The appendix is present 
Bind unremarkable. The pancreas has its normal size and shape; cut surface is lobular, 
tan, and firm. 
HEPATOBILIARY SYSTEM: The liver weighs 1600 grams and has a smooth intact capsule. The 
organ is of normal consistency with a sharp edge. Cut surface is smooth, dark pink, 
*nd shows intact lobular architecture with slight acute passive congestion. The 
gallbladder and bile ducts appear normal. 
•1EMATOLYMPHATIC SYSTEM: The spleen appears to be surgically absent (remote). The lymph 
lodes are small and inconspicuous where examined. The vertebral marrow is dark red 
and abundant. 
yITOUR 1NARY SYSTEM: The kidneys are normally situated and weigh about 175 grams each. 
rhe thin capsules strip with ease, revealing a smooth, pink-tan subcapsular surface 
without focal lesions. The cortex is of average thickness and the collecting system is 
unremarkable. The bladder is slightly distended and contains about 400 cc of clear yellow 
'Jc-me: / :,-r<r.KR, R .'ck R. 
•.? hi 1a t e i ally d- .sc« ;ir; ed ^ ;id un nwv* r 7:'; b J e to pa J pa tion. 
:KDOCRIh'E SYS1EM_: L'nrer.a r7; .?2> J e. 
1VSCVL0SKELETAL SYSTEM: See description of injuries. h'o pre-existing injury or gross 
deformity is noted. 
'ENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM: See description of injuries. 
OXICOLOGY: The following specimens are submitted for toxicology: 
eart blood, liver, bile, urine, and stomach contents. 
ECTIONS: Routine sections are submitted for storage in fori~al in. 
OTE: Tbe injuries described above are schematically represer.zed on diagrams GME-3, 
ME-8, OME-9, and OME-10. 
OUTH: There are no recent fractures of the teeth; the right lower mid incisor is absent 
remote extraction). 
INDINGS: 
I. Multiple recent craniocerebral injuries due to blunt force z::^:a zo r.V ;iv. r*. 
A. Fracture of the 'nasal bones. 
B. Hemorrhages of the undei-surface of the scalp, galea, and temporal muscles. 
C. Cutaneous abrasions, ecchymoses, patterned contusions, and lacerations of 
the lips. 
D. Contusions of the cerebral cortex. 
E. Moderate cerebral edema. 
F. Acute subdural hematoma. 
II. Multiple injuries to the neck region due to blunt force trauma. 
A. Cutaneous abrasions and ecchymoses of the neck. 
B. Hemorrhages into the strap muscles, isthmus of the thyroid gland, bilateral 
sternocleidomastiod muscles, and anterior spinous ligaments of tbe cervical 
spine. 
III. Cutaneous abrasions and ecchymoses of the trunk, upper extremities, and right 
lower extremities due to blunt force trauma. 
IV. Pulmonary edema and congestion. 
V. Slight acute passive congestion of the viscera. 
VI. Status-post left parietal craniotomy, remote. 
rJuinc: ALKC^LER, Rick R. 
VII. Status-post splenectomy, remote. 
Os? No: £5~C: 
OPINION: In my opinion Rick Abeggler expired from injuries to the brain and its meninges 
-esulting from blunt force trauma to the head. 
•ANKER OF DEATH: Homicide. 
'IS/ce SHARON iSSCHN1TTKERr M.D. 
7'13/85 Acting Medical Examiner 
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